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FORMATION OF CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE OF GOODS*
CALVIN W. CORNMAN*
I. INTRODUCTION
All advanced legal systems, and all bodies concerned with governing
international trade transactions, are today struggling with the problems
connected with the need to develop acceptable legal rules for contract
formation, particularly involving the sale of goods. This article will
set forth some of the problems that are inherent in contract formation,
and will describe and compare some of the solutions offered (1) by the
civil law systems, especially as seen in Japan, Germany, and France;
(2) by the common law systems, especially as expressed both in the
developing Second Restatement of Contracts and in the Uniform
Commercial Code Article on Sales; and (3) by international bodies,
especially as seen in the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods.'
In the United States, modification of the rules of offer and accept-
ance acquired early impetus from the writings of Llewellyn in the
1930's,2 and from his work in the 1940's while he was Reporter for
the proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act.' The decision to develop a
more expansive Uniform Commercial Code (hereinafter UCC)
changed only the format, and except for revisions in terminology, the
fundamental concepts of the earlier proposals -continued to be ad-
vanced, so that many basic positions on contract formation asserted
Copyright reserved.
** Professor of Law, Rutgers, The State University. B.B.A. 1942, LL.B. 1944,
Baylor Univ.; LL.M. 1950, Univ. of Michigan. The author wishes to acknowledge the
assistance of Mir. Kazuaki Sono, LL.B. 1957, LL.M. 1959, Kansai University, in pre-
paring Japanese legal materials included in this article.
'For a comparative study of the 1958 "Rome" draft of the proposed Uniform Law
on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, with the Pre-
liminary Draft of a Convention on a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Tangible Property prepared by the Inter-American Council of Jurists and published
in 1960, and the General Conditions for Sale prepared by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Europe, see Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales
Contracts: Three Attempts at Unificatom, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 305-29 (1962).
'Llewellyn, On Our Case-Law of Contract: Offer and Acceptance, (pts. 1-2), 48
YALE L.J. 1, 779 (1938-1939). See also Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of
the Reszlting Legal Relations, 26 YALE L.J. 169 (1917) ; Holahan, Contract Formali-
ties and the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 ViLL. L. REv. 1 (1957) ; Holsworth, The
Formation and Breach of Contract, 7 Tur.. L. REv. 165 in 38 Com. L.J. 659 (1933) ;
Stoljar, Offer, Promise and Agreement, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 445-56 (1955); Whittier,
The Restatement of Contracts and Mutual Assent, 17 CALIF. L. REv. 441 (1929).
'UNIORm REisE SALES Acr (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944). Professor
Soia Mentschikoff served as Assistant Reporter.
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two decades earlier are reflected in the current version of the UCC.
Further study is being carried forward by the Second Restatement of
Contracts, and the revised portions significant to this article have been
approved by the American Law Institute.4
There has been parallel, independent study on contract formation
in international transactions during this same quarter century. The
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law has been
active during this period, working toward adoption of uniform rules
for the formation of international sales contracts. The Institute's first
draft of a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods and the early drafts of the proposed Uniform
Revised Sales Act in the United States were both developed prior to
World War II. This parallel development continued, and the second
"Rome" draft for an International Act was completed at the same
time that intensive study of the proposed UCC progressed in the
United States. The present text of the UCC was formulated in 1962;
the final draft of the Uniform International Act was completed at the
Hague in 1964, with the United States delegation actively participating
for the first time as representatives of a member nation.' Following
'Tentative Draft No. 1 of RESTATE ENT (SECOND), CONTRA s, was approved by
the American Law Institute at its 1964 annual meeting. Braucher, Offer and Ac-
ceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE, L.J. 302 (1964).
' The current (1964) formulation of a Uniform Law on the Formation of Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods, and covering Convention, together with
the 1964 Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, and covering Convention,
were approved by the Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law governing
the International Sale of Goods held at the Hague in April 1964. An alternate
article 1 to the 1964 Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods provides: "The present law shall apply to the formation of con-
tracts of sale of goods which, if they were concluded, would be governed by the
Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods." Article 1 of the Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods specifies the circumstances when that law is to apply.
The scope of the application may, however, be limited by adoption and application of
article II, paragraph 2, of the Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Inter-
national Sale of Goods.
For published discussion of the 1964 Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, see Michida, Possible Avenues to Preparation of Standard Contracts for
Internatioltal Trade on a Global Level, a paper presented at the September 1964
Colloquium of the International Association of Legal Science, in UNIcIATION OF THE
LAw GoVERNING INTERNATIONAL SALES OF GOODS (Dalloz, Paris, 1966) (comparative
study of the formation of contracts under the ECE General Conditions, Comecon
Conditions, Hague Conference Draft of 1964 on contract formation and UCC §§ 2-202,
2-205, 2-206, 2-207); Nadelmann, The United States and Plans for a Uniform
(World) Law on International Sale of Goods, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 697 (1964) ; Tunc,
The Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods: A Reply to Professor
Nadelnann, 74 YALE L.J. 1409 (1965); de Winter, Loi Uniforme Sur La Vente
Internationale Des Objects Mobiliers Corporels et le Droit International Privi, 11
NETHERLANDS INT'L L. Rxv. 271-79 (1964)
For publications concerned with earlier drafts of the proposed Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods or the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, see Bystricky & Landa, The Unification of Laws
on International Sale, Rev. of Contemp. Law 67, June 1959; Chesire, International
[ VOL. 42 : 347
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the approval of the proposed draft at The Hague in 1964, it has now
been submitted to the member nations for consideration and possible
ratification.
II. THE OFFER
The Japanese Civil Code does not expressly differentiate an invita-
tion to submit an offer from an offer itself. The two are nevertheless
regarded as distinct, both in theory and in practice, for general stan-
dards are used to ascertain when the invitation gives the recipient the
the power to create, by his acceptance, a legally enforceable contract.
Although there have been few reported Japanese decisions which have
directly faced the problem of this distinction,6 the scholars unani-
mously seem to differentiate an invitation to make an offer from the
offer itself,7 applying the same standards as those in Anglo-American
law.
Anglo-American law, emphasizing the bargain aspect of the trans-
action, defines an offer as a "manifestation of willingness to enter into
a bargain, so made as to justify another person in understanding that
his assent to that bargain is invited and will conclude it."'
If the addressee of the manifestation either knows or has reason to
know that the person making it does not intend to conclude the bargain
at that time, then the manifestation is merely a stage in the preliminary
Contracts for the Sale of Goods, 1960 J. Bus. L. 282; An International Code of the
Law of Sale, 1933 BRIT. YB. INT'L L. 75; Honnold, Uniform Law for International
Sales, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 299 (1959) ; Jacobson, International Sale of Goods, 3 INT'L
& COmP. L.Q. 659-73 (1954) ; Keyes, Toward a Single Law Governing the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods-A Comparative Study, 42 CALIF. L. REv. 653-75 (1954);
Lagergren, Uniform Law of International Sales of Goods, 1958 J. Bus. L. 131;
Rabel, Hague Conference on the Unification of Sales Law, 1 Am. J. ComP. LAw 58
(1952); Wortley, The Need for More Uniformity in the Law Relating to the
International Sale of Goods in Europe, 10 IN'L & Cozi.. L.Q. 45 (Supp. No. 1,
1961) ; Wortley, A Uniform Law on International Sales of Goods, 7 INT'L & CoMP.
L.Q. 1 (1958) ; Note, An International Code of the Law of Sale, 176 L.T. 411 (1933).
* Shimoide v. Wada, H6arrsu siMBUN (No. 702) 25 (Anotsu Dist. Ct. March
15, 1911) (case discussed in note 16 infra) ; Japan v. Kawasai, 7 Minroku 157 (Gr.
Ct. Cass., May 31, 1901).
But note the following observation on the Japanese law of sales, Braucher, Corn-
inerial Law in Japan and America, 47 A.B.A.J. 150, 153 (1961) :
Claims for commercial damages have given rise to numerous decisions, but the
code provisions remain the subject of a substantial number of unsettled disputes
going to basic questions of theory and scope.... Scholars' opinions are not
greatly affected by judicial opinions; in the absence of a doctrine of precedent,judicial decisions do not finally resolve the many unsettled questions. Nor does
there seem to be any feeling that legislative clarification is urgent, or any
established machinery which is likely to produce legislative revision.
'IsHIDA, SAIKEN KAKURON (Detailed discussion on obligations) 6 (1955); 5(1)
WAGATSUMA, SAIREN KAKURONT 57 (1954); Minamitani, Boeki keiyaku no seiritsu
(Formation of trade contracts), B6EKI TO H6RITSU 191-96, in 8 B6EKI JITSUMU KOZA
(Ishikawa ed. 1962).
'See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONTRACTS § 24 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964) [herein-
after cited as REsTxAtrEr (SEcOND), CONTRACTS].
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negotiations.9 This applies to advertisements of goods, either by dis-
play, by newspaper, radio and television, or by catalogues, price lists,
and circulars. These advertisements are not ordinarily intended, nor
usually understood, as offers to sell.'" Nor are submittals of price
quotations as statements of price per unit of quantity, nor requests
for bids on a construction project, usually construed as offers. The
submittal of unsigned documents or letters is only an advance indica-
tion in preliminary negotiations.
Courts in both the civil law system and the common law system
must frequently differentiate preliminary negotiations by seller" and
purchaser' 2 from offers leading to the sale of goods."B In France,
'Id. at § 25.
1 See Annot, Seller's advertisements as affecting rights of parties to sale of
personal property, 158 A.L.R. 1413 (1945) ; Annot., Advertisement or circular letter
addressed to public or special class of persons, and relating to purchase or sale, as an
offer acceptance of which will consummate a contract, 157 A.L.R. 744 (1945).
n See, e.g., Robert Gordon, Inc. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 117 F.2d 654 (7th Cir.
1941) (prices quoted in manufacturer's letter to contractor to enable the contractor
to submit a bid) ; Truscon Steel Co. v. Cooke, 98 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1938) (price
quotation); J.E. Pinkham Lumber Co. v. C. W. Griffin & Co., 212 Ala. 341, 102 So.
689 (1925) (circulars); People v. Gimbel Bros., 202 Misc. 229, 115 N.Y.S.2d 857
(Sup. Ct. 1952) (advertisement); Ehrlich v. Willis Music Co., 93 Ohio App. 246,
113 N.E.2d 252 (1952) (advertisement) ; Courteen Seed Co. v. Abraham, 129 Ore.
427, 275 Pac. 684 (1929) (telegram--'I am asking 23 cents/pound for the car of red
clover") ; Reed Bros. Stone Co. v. Pittman Constr. Co., 20 Tenn. App. 552, 101 S.W.
2d 478 (Ct.App. 1937) (proposals submitted for stone "approximately" needed under
altered building plans); Nickel v. Theresa Farmers Co-op. Ass'n, 247 Wis. 412, 20
N.W.2d 117 (1945) (delivery of goods in accordance with prior price quotations
established contract).
'See,, e.g., Frederick v. Curtright, 137 Cal. App. 610, 290 P.2d 875 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1955) ; KIemm Reflector Co. v. Munro, 321 Pa. 25, 183 Atl. 803 (1936) (estimate
that 200 reflectors could be sold in three months under requirements contract);
Excelsior Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Bush, 38 Wn. 2d 876, 233 P.2d 847 (1951) (tentative
order for merchandise to be manufactured by seller taken subject to manufacturer's
acceptance).
'For cases dealing with offer rather than preliminary negotiation to sell goods
see, e.g., National Dairymen Ass'n v. Dean Milk Co., 183 F.2d 349 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 876 (1950); In re Marcalus Mfg. Co, 120 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J.
1954) ; Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 66 Cal. App. 2d 609, 152 P.2d 774 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1944) (telegram regarding the sale of wine); South Branch Cheese Co. v.
American Butter & Cheese Co., 191 Mich. 507, 158 N.W. 158 (1916); J. W. Carter
Co. v. Farley Cothing Co., 216 Miss. 238, 62 So. 2d 305 (1953) (shoes shipped with-
out obtaining purchase order); Merit Specialties Co. v. Gilbert Brass Foundry
Co., 362 Mo. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718 (1951). In Excelsior Knitting Mills, Inc. v.
Bush, 38 Wn.2d 876, 877, 233 P.2d 847, 848 (1951), the manufacturer's letter stating
that he had placed the received order in work constituted an offer. "The appellant,
in placing the order 'in work,' took a calculated risk of securing respondent's ac-
ceptance of its offer by confirmation of the order."
For cases dealing with offer rather than preliminary negotiations to purchase
goods, see, e.g., United States v. Landers, 128 F. Supp. 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd
mem., 219 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1954); Industrial Prods. Mfg. Co. v. Jewett Lumber
Co., 185 F.2d 866 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Oedekerk v. Muncie Gear Works, 179 F2d 821
(7th Cir. 1950) (rocket tubes) ; Abbott v. Stephany Poultry Co., 44 Del. Super. 513,
62 A.2d 243 (1948) (poultry); Underwood Veneer Co. v. Faber Mach. Co., 287 Ill.
App. 630, 5 N.E.2d 613 (1937) ; Sheldon-Seatz Inc. v. Coles, 319 Mich. 401, 29 N.W.
2d 832 (1947); Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Ore. 359, 230 P.2d 188 (1951).
[ VOL. 42: 347
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although there is some commentary to the contrary, 4 both the courts
and scholars of law recognize that trade circulars and catalogues
advertising goods for sale serve only as invitations to receive offers.'1
Article 4 of the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods (hereinafter referred to as the Uniform
International Act) states in negative fashion that a communication to
specific persons shall not constitute an offer unless prescribed require-
ments as to objectives and definiteness are satisfied; it must indicate
the offeror's intention to be bound, and be sufficiently definite to per-
mit the conclusion of the contract by acceptance. 6 These broad
standards, however, offer little guidance for specific application."
"See, e.g., 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET BARDE, TRAiTA DES OBLIGATIONS § 30 (3d
ed. 1906) : circulars are considered as a form of offer that remains open to the extent
of available stock, similar to where the goods are displayed in a shop window or on
a shop counter with price designated.
" Req. 29.4.1903, D. 1904.1.136; Req. 20.2.1905, S. 1905.1.508. [All French citations
conform to the citation conventions set out in Amos & WALTON, INTRODUCTIO' TO
FRENCH LAW, pp. xiii-xv (2d ed. 1963).] 6 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAiTk PRATIguE
DE DROIT CIVIL § 127 n.1 (2d ed. 1952-1960) ; Amos & WALTON, op. cit. stpra at 154-55.
" The same standards are recognized in Japanese law. See WAGATSUMA, op. Cit.
supra note 7, at 57.
The problem of objective conformity of offer and acceptance in regard to the
formation of a contract, and application of these standards to resolve them, are well-
illustrated in Shimoide v. Wada, H6RiTsu SHIMBUN (No. 702) 25 (Anotsu Dist.
Ct., March 15, 1911). In that case B wired S: "Quote me the price for soy bean
waste produced in Port Arthur for shipment in January." On the same day S replied
by telegram: "We will sell soy bean waste at the price of Y 2.50 per 10 sheets, ship-
ment in January, arrival at Yokkaichi, insurance and freight paid."
On the following day, B wired: "Received your telegram. Will buy 10,000 sheets."
To which S replied: "Received your last telegram. Will negotiate with the pro-
ducer. Please keep your order open till tomorrow." In response B replied: "We
received your telegram saying you will sell. Cannot wait." By this telegram B
implied that the contract was already formed, and before this telegram reach S, S
wired: "We have negotiated with the producer. Can accept your order at 1 3.00
per 10 sheets." B did not respond to this telegram, believing S was bound by the
contract to furnish 10,000 sheets at T 2.50 per 10 sheets.
There were no further communications betveen the parties until two months
later when the market price for soy bean waste had risen considerably. After sending
two or three notices to S demanding performance, B sent a final notice asking S
to perform within seven days. When S failed to perform, B sought damages for
breach. B claimed that S's telegram ("We will sell ... at Y 2.50...) was an offer
which was accepted by B's telegram ("Received your telegram. Will buy 10,000
sheets.").
The court noted, however, that the first mention of the quantity of 10,000 sheets
first appeared in B's purported acceptance telegram, whereas nothing about quantity
was mentioned in S's purported offer. Therefore, it was impossible for the court to
find that 10,000 sheets was the quantity fixed by both parties as an essential term of
the purported contract. The court interpreted S's initial telegram as a simple price
quotation-an invitation for an offer. B's telegram in response was the offer. Since
it was never accepted by S, there was no contract.
"Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts: Three Attempts at
Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 312 (1962) :
Not only is this language [UNORM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 3 (1958 draft)]
too vague to be of much help in the kinds of situations which cause trouble but
the test for determining whether a communication is sufficiently definite to
constitute an offer is circular. It can hardly be regarded as an adequate sub-
19671
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Interpretation of the communication may be clarified by reference to
preliminary negotiations, to established practices between the parties,
to usage, and to any applicable legal rules for contracts of sale.18
Both the Japanese Civil Code and the Uniform International Act
declare that the offeror cannot be bound until his offer has been com-
municated to the offeree;' 9 the offer will lapse if its withdrawal is
communicated to the offeree before or at the same time as the offer .2
III. TERMINATION OF THE OFFEREE'S POWER OF ACCEPTANCE BY
REVOCATION OF THE OFFER
A. Civil Law Approach
Although the legislative provisions under consideration differ regard-
ing the manner of expression of offers, these differences are not sub-
stantial. But this is not true of the termination by revocation of the
offeree's power of acceptance. In Japan, if an offer specifies a period
for acceptance, it is irrevocable during that period; 2 and if a time limit
is not stated in an offer made inter absentes, revocation is not permitted
before the expiration of the time reasonably necessary for the offeror
to receive notice of acceptance. 2 This allows for the possibility that,
following receipt of the offer, the offeree may wish to make a special
investigation, prompted perhaps by the nature of the offer and/or by
the receipt of other offers. He can, of course, communicate his accept-
ance effectively within the stated period; or if no period is stated, then
he is given a reasonable period for acceptance, so that he is protected
against the possible imposition by the legal system of an unexpected
stitute for the more detailed rules found in most legal systems and would merely
invite any tribunal to fill in the lacunae by application of its own domestic law,
contrary to the stated purpose of the draft.
Article 4 of the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods [hereinafter cited as UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT (1964 draft)] is
similar to article 3 of the "Rome" draft of 1958. However, article 4(2), suggesting
available sources for interpretation of the communication, is new to the present
formulation.
'
8 UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 4(2) (1964 draft).
"JAPANESE CivIL CODE art. 97(1): "A declaration of intention made inter ab-
sentes shall be effective as from the time when notice thereof has reached the other
party." [This translation, and those of the Japanese Civil Code provisions which
follow, are taken from 2 Eibun horeisha Law Bulletin Series (hereinafter EHS)
No. 2100 (1966). ] ; UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 5(1) (1964 draft).
'UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 5(1) (1964 draft) : "The offer shall not bind
the offeror until it has been communicated to the offeree; it shall lapse if its with-
drawal is communicated to the offeree before or at the same time as the offer."
't JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 521(1): "An offer specifying a period for acceptance
cannot be revoked."
' JAPAN-ESE CivIL CODE art. 524.
[ VOL. 42 : 347
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loss.2 It is presumed here that there is an intent to keep these offers
open either for a fixed period or for a reasonable period.
The offeror in Japan, however, can regulate the matter of revocation
by stating in the offer that he may revoke it at any time, despite a
pre-established fixed time for acceptance.
Other methods of termination of the offeree's power of acceptance
are recognized both in Japan and in the United States. 4 When the
offer is made inter absentes, the power of acceptance may terminate at
the end of the time stated in the offer,25 or if no time is specified, at the
end of a reasonable time .2  But an offer to enter into a contract made
inter praesentes must be accepted immediately or a lapse results."
I See 5(1) WAGATSULIA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 60. See also de Becker's comment
to Civil Code article 521, DE BECKER'S ANNOTATED CIVIL CODE OF JAPAN 123 (1909) :
The offeror cannot freely withdraw his offer within the specified period of time,
because the other party may require to make some preparations for accepting it,
and if after he had made those preparations and was about to accept the offer,
the offeror suddenly withdrew the offer, it might cause a great deal of prejudice
and annoyance to the other party.
See also Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, And Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YALE L.J. 169, 197 & n.56 (1917), in SELECTED READINGS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
170, 191 n.56 (1931).
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 35. Methods of Termination of the
Power of Acceptance:
(1) An offeree's power of acceptance may be terminated by
(a) rejection or counter-offer by the offeree, or
(b) lapse of time, or
(c revocation by the offeror, or(d) death or incapacity of the offeror or offeree.
(2) In addition, an offeree's power of acceptance is terminated by the failure of
any condition of acceptance arising under the terms of the offer.
'JAPANESE Civr CODE art. 521(2): "If the offeror does not receive notice of
acceptance within the period specified, the offer shall lapse." Cf. RESTATFmENT
(SECOND), CONTRACTS §§ 35(1)(b), 40.
'JAPANESE COMrCIAL CODE art. 508(1) [as translated in 2 EHS No. 2200
(1963)]: "An offer to enter into a contract in respect of which no period of accep-
tance has been fixed, when made inter absentes, shall lapse if notice of its acceptance
is not dispatched by the offeree within a reasonable period." Note, however, that
this provision applies only when the transaction to be entered into is a "commercial
transaction."
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 40. Lapse of Time: "(1) An offeree's
power of acceptance is terminated at the time specified in the offer, or, if no time is
specified, at the end of a reasonable time."
GERMAN CIvIL CODE (BGB) art. 146:
(1) The offer lapses when declined as to the offeror or when not accepted in the
time prescribed by secs. 147-49.
(2) What is a reasonable time is a question of fact, depending on all the
circumstances existing when the offer and attempted acceptance are made.
(3) Unless otherwise indicated by the language or the circumstances, and subject
to the rule stated in sec. 51, an offer sent by mail is seasonably accepted if an
acceptance is mailed at any time before midnight on the day on which the offer
is received.
= JAPANESE COMMRCIAL CODE art. 507. Again, this is a Commercial Code pro-
vision; hence, it does not apply to "non-commercial transactions" (see also note 26
supra). However, scholars are of the opinion that in most cases the same rule should
be applied even to "civil transactions" unless special circumstances exist; e.g., where
19671
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This is unduly harsh upon the offeree, who may need time to consider
the offer before making his decision. Because of this, the Uniform
International Act includes the qualification that acceptance of an oral
offer must be immediate only if the circumstances show that the offeree
does not need time for reflection.28
For the Japanese offeree's power of acceptance to be terminated by
revocation of the offer made inter absentes, notice of the revocation
must normally arrive before the dispatch of the acceptance. 29 Al-
though this is not specifically expressed in either the Japanese Civil or
Commercial Codes, it can be inferred from article 526(1) of the Civil
Code, which provides that a contract inter absentes comes into exist-
ence when notice of acceptance is dispatched."°
A delay in the arrival of the notice of revocation alters the condi-
tions. If the acceptor knows that the revocation was dispatched so
that it normally would have arrived before the dispatch of the notice
of acceptance, he must immediately dispatch to the offeror notice of
the delayed arrival."' If he fails to do so, the acceptance is not effec-
tive, and the contract does not come into existence. 2
The Japanese position regarding the effective revocation of offers,
as expressed in Japan's Civil Code, has been directly influenced by
the developed law of Europe, especially by the law of Germany. In
Germany, the offeror is precluded from withdrawing an offer until the
expiration of any fixed period; if no time limit is imposed, the offeror
does not have the power to withdraw his offer during the period in
which he could have reasonably expected to receive a reply, unless he
expressly states otherwise.33 That is, under the German Civil Code
the binding offer remains open until either a specified or a reasonable
the offeror implied that the offeree may reply later. See ISHIDA, op. cit. supra note 7
at 10; 5(1) WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 60.
UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 8(1) (1964 draft).
SSee ISHIDA, op. cit. supra note 7, at 10; 5(1) WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note
7, at 61.
'At the time of compilation of Japanese Civil Code art. 526(1), the proposition
was thoroughly discussed. Although its origin may be traced to Boissonade, it is
clear that the drafters were also influenced by the common law position in that the
following decisions were cited: Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng.
Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818) ; Household Fire & Carriage Acc. Ins. Co. v. Grant, 4 Ex. D. 216
(C.A. 1879) ; Byrne v. Van Tienhoven, 5 C.P.D. 344 (Common Pleas Div. 1880).
"JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 527 (1).
"JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 527(2).
' GERMAN CIVIL CODE (BGB) art. 145: "An offer to contract is binding upon the
offeror unless he has provided for the contrary."
The length of time that the offer remains open will depend upon the offeror's in-
tention or the particular circumstances. GERMAN CIVIL CODE (BGB) art. 151(2).
[ VOL. 42: 347
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time has elapsed.34 These two legal systems have similar approaches
to delayed arrival of acceptance and to revocation of the offerY
The present position began to evolve in European jurisprudence
near the beginning of the nineteenth century,36 due in part to the
increased use of the mails for communication. The concept that the
offer was irrevocable for a legally fixed time originated in legislative
form with the Prussian Code of 179437 and the Austrian Code of
1811.8 In Germany, it was first brought into the Commercial Code,
and then into the Civil Code. 9 This legislation directly influenced
the adoption of a similar position in the Japanese Code of 1898.40
The offeror in Germany may avoid making a binding offer by insert-
ing a freibleibend (without obligation) clause in his communication,
thereby reversing the positions of the parties. A communication that
would normally be considered a firm offer becomes only an invitation,
and its "acceptance" by the recipient becomes the offer. To afford
some protection to the recipient of a communication containing a
freibleibend clause, the legislation requires that the original offeror,
upon receipt of an affirmative response, must immediately reply to the
contrary, or be subject to the presumption that he has accepted the
offer.
"' GERMAN CIVIL CODE (BGB), art. 147: "The offer made to a person present must
be immediately accepted. This applies also to offers made by one person to another
over the telephone. An offer made to an absent person must be accepted during the
time the offeror may expect the arrival of the answer under regular circumstances."
GERMAN CIVIL CODE (BGB) art. 148: "In case a time was fixed by the offeror for
the acceptance, the acceptance must be made within this time."
SGERMAN" CIVIL CODE (BGB) art. 149: "In case the acceptance was forwarded in
due time by the offeree, but delivered belatedly to the offeror, the latter, if he should
have known of the due acceptance must, on receiving the acceptance, notify the offeree
of the delay unless he has done so before. If he delays the notifications, the acceptance
will not be considered as belated." See Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-
American Offer-And-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 COLUm. L. REV. 920, 923 (1936).
Cf. JAPANEsE CIVIL CODE art. 527, with regard to delayed arrival of notice of the
revocation of an offer:
(1) Even in cases where notice of the revocation of an offer has arrived after
notice of acceptance has been despatched, if the acceptor could have known that it
was despatched at such a time that it would have under normal circumstances
arrived before the despatch of the notice of acceptance, the acceptor shall des-
patch without delay notice of the delayed arrival to the offeror.
(2) If the acceptor has neglected to give the notice mentioned in the preceding
paragraph, the contract shall be deemed not to have come into existence.
See also notes 31 and 32 supra and accompanying text.
' The binding force of unilateral promises had been recognized as early as
medieval German law. 3 VoN GiERxE, DEUTS ES PRIVA!CREcT 284 (1917).
'Allgemeines Landrecht fuer die Preussischen Staten, pt. I, tit. 5, § 91; Nuss-
baum, supra note 35, at 923.
'Allgemeines Buergerliches Gesetzbuch fuer das Kaisertum Oesterreich § 862,
SGm.ANr CIVIL CODE (BGB) arts. 145-49. See notes 33-35 supra. Irrevocability
of the offer was expressed in the German Commercial Code of 1861 and subsequently
in the German Civil Code of 1896 that became effective in 1900.
" See JAPAXESE CIvIL CODE arts. 521, 524. See notes 21-23 supra.
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After the First World War, when the German economic system
moved through a period of inflation followed by a period of deflation,
the use of freibleibend clauses increased, especially in commercial
transactions,41 and their use has continued to increase, until today
these clauses are incorporated into many forms of offer. There is now
general recognition of this practice in most civil law systems of
Europe.42 The standard order form used by automobile sales agencies
in Germany calls for the buyer's signature to a provision binding him
for thirty days, subject to rejection by the offeree during that period. 3
There has been a parallel development in the law of France;
French law permits the withdrawal of an offer at any time before it
is accepted,4 but there are circumstances which modify this rule. A
promise to keep an offer open for a fixed time precludes revocation
during that period.45 Where the period of the firm offer is indefinite,
the offer is not retractable until reasonable notice has been given of the
intent to withdraw.46 The theory of the firm offer is usually based on
the view that the promise to keep the offer open is tacitly accepted by
the offeree,47 rather than that the promisor is bound simply by reason
of the unilateral declaration of his will.4  This latter proposition has
'A reservation freibleiben4 (without obligation) is to be distinguished from
Preise freibleibend (Without obligation as to prices), as the latter binds the buyer
to pay an increased price in accordance with changing market conditions, i.e., an
open price clause. Absent a definite price agreement of the parties, such clause
serves to establish a reasonable price based upon the existing market price. Reichs-
gerichts, Feb. 14, 1912, 103 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Zivilsachen 414.
See Nussbaum, supra note 35, at 928. See also Daniels, The German Law of Sales,
6 Am. J. Comp. LAW 470, 479 (1957).
" See text accompanying notes 21-23, 39-41 supra.
"Z. v. S. Reichsgericht, Jan. 28, 1921 (1921-1) 50 Juristische Wochenschrift
392; Grouchots Beitragen zur Erlauterung des Deutschen Rechts 339; Appellate
Court of Munich, Nov. 8, 1918, 74 Seufferts Archlv. 147. Aubrey, The Formation of
International Contracts, with Reference to the Uniform Law on Formation, 14 INT'L
& ComP. L.Q. 1011, 1014 (1965) ; Nussbaum, supra note 35, at 928. The German courts
have refused to read a tacit "without engagement?' clause into an offer to sell com-
modities in an advanced stage of inflation. Reichsgericht, May 11, 1920, Juristische
Wochenschrift (1920) (iron ware); Dec. 8, 1920 ibid. (1921) 234 (motors);
Nussbaum, supra note 35, at 928.
"Civ. 3.2.1919, D. 1923.1.126. Amos & WALTo, INTRODUcrioN To FRENCH LAW
155 (2d ed. 1963).
Civ. 1.6.1953, Bulletin des Arrgts de la Chamber Civile de la Cour de Cassation(Bull. civ.) 1953.1.147; Civ. 24.10.1950, Bull. civ. 1950.1.155; Grenoble, 8.11.1950,
D.1951.687; PLANIOL ET RiPERT, TnRArT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, n? 174 (1957-
1959).
"Civ. 10.6.1941, Gazette du Palais (Gaz. Pal.) 19412.87.
'
TDemolombe 24, Cours de Code Napoleon §§ 64, 65. Cf. Nancy, 13-11.1952, D.
1953.12; Colmar, 4.2.1936, D.H. 1936.187; 6 PLANIOL Er RIPmRT, op. cit. supra note 45,
at n°131.
"This position is advocated in 2 COLiN, CAPITANT ET DE LA MORANDIERH,
TRArrt DE DRorr CivuL n046.
It is observed in 1 BAUDRY-LACANTINIERE ET BARDME, TRAITA DE DRorr CiviL 80 n°33:
The majority of authors, while considering the agreements the sole source of
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received more extensive recognition in German jurisprudence. 9
The proposed French-Italian Code of Obligations, promulgated
during the second quarter of the present century50 and subsequently
abandoned in favor of independent revisions of the French and Italian
Civil Codes, stated that the revocation of the offer should not serve
as an obstacle to the formation of the contract.51 It is recognized that
a promise could be the source of a legal obligation, provided that it
was placed in written form and specified a definite duration. French
legal writers have suggested several theoretical bases for the irrevoca-
bility of the firm offer during an allotted time: (1) that its withdrawal
constitutes a fault; (2) that it is binding on principles of contract
formation; and (3) that it is binding by application of the theory of
unilateral willP2 Each of these theories has on occasion been supported
by the courts.53
voluntary obligations, admit that, in the case of which we speak, the offer may
be accepted in the course of delay, notwithstanding the anterior retraction. 6
Toulier, n.30, 4 Aubry et Rau, p. 292 5th ed., pp. 481, 482; 24 Demolombe, n.65;
15 Laurent, n.476, 5th ed. Such is also the solution adopted by the jurisprudence,
and one could not be astonished for, if the judges pronounced in a contrary
sense, prudent persons would not dare, the greater part of the time, to bind
themselves to the propositions of sale or purchase. But in the judicial point of
view, it appears impossible to us to justify this solution, if one does not admit
that, in our hypothesis, the unilateral will engenders a bond of law. Every
offer which is accompanied by the fixing of a delay for the acceptance gives
birth by itself to two distinct obligations; first to the obligation to maintain
the offer during the delay fixed; then to the conditional obligation to accom-
plish the performance which forms the object of the offer, if the latter is ac-
cepted. These two obligations have for generating cause a unilateral manifes-
tation of will.
See Note, 5 Tur.. L. Ray. 632, n.24 (1931). See also Note, 16 TUL. L. REv. 456,
463-64 (1942):
The Code Napoleon does not have an article corresponding to Article 1809 of
the Louisiana Civil Code. Nevertheless, the majority of the French commenta-
tors reach the same result by the interpretation of Article 1101 of the Code
Napoleon and agree that there can be no revocation for the stated time or a
reasonable time.
SIEGEL, DAS VESPRECHEN ALS VERPELICH-TUNGSRUND, (1874); Stobbe, 13 ZErr-
scHRiFT FUR RF-cHTSGESCHICTE. See also German Civil Code provisions, notes 33-35
sucpra.
' The first draft was published in 1927 to be followed by subsequent studies.
FRANco-ITALiAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 2.
n FRANcO-ITALIAN CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 60. Article 2 involved the offer to
contract, and article 4 the public promise of a reward. Planiol, a critic of the theory
that a unilateral declaration of will is binding on the maker independently of any
acceptance by another person, observed that the Franco-Italian Code of Obligations
"(pays) homage to the new idea that the will obligates him who gives it without
an acceptance being necessary. But in truth such a concept remains purely theoretical."
2 PLANIOL, TRArrP _LtIIENTAIRE DE DROIT CivIL § 834 (Louisiana State Law Institute
Translation 1939).
112 RiPERT & BOULANGER, TRAA- RLPMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL DE PLANIOL §
334, at 126-27 (4th ed. 1952) (fault) ; 2 COLIN & CA:PITANT, COURS "LPMENTAIRE DE
DROIT CrvIL FRANCAIS § 46, at 35-36 (10th ed. 1953) (three theories discussed).
'Schmitt v. Mey, Colmar, 4.2.1936, D.H. 1936.187 187 (irrevocable contract);
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The 1950 proposed draft for a new French Civil Code precludes
the revocation of an offer that sets a period for acceptance; or if such
a period results from the particular circumstances, it precludes revoca-
tion until the expiration of that period." A comparable provision in
the Italian Civil Code binds the offeror to keep his offer open for the
stated period. This is also true where one party agrees to be bound
by his offer but the other party has the option to accept or refuse itYt
The Italian Commercial Code is more restrictive in that the offeror
retains the power of revocation but subjects himself to liability for
damages if the offeree had prepared to perform the contract in reliance
on the offer." This position rests upon the culpa-in-contrahendo the-
ory elaborated in Germany during the last century by Rudolf von
Jhering.57 But even this deviation from the position accepted today
by most European legal systems is mitigated by the established rule
of Italian commercial law, where it is presumed that the offeror waives
his right to require acceptance when the offer is stated for a definite
period. 8
This approach of the European civil law systems, especially as
expressed in Germany and in the closely related Japanese system, can be
contrasted with that of the common law system, particularly with that
Jahn v. Charry, Bordeaux, 17.1.1870, D. 18712.96 (withdrawal of offer recognized but
constituted a fault).
The courts have not generally accepted these theories. See, e.g., de Portes v.
Vullier, Civ. 3.2.1919, D. 1923.1.126; von Mehren, The French Civil Code and
Contract: A Comparative Analysis of Formation and Form, 15 LA. L. REV. 687, n.2
(1955).
"Travaux de la Commission de R~forme duy Code Civil Anne 1948-1949 art. 11,
at 705 (1950) :
The offeror may revoke his offer if it has not yet been accepted. However,
when the offer sets a period for acceptance or such a period results from the
circumstances of the case, the offer cannot be revoked before this period has
expired, except in the case where the offer has not yet come to the attention of
the offeree.
von Mehren, supra note 53, at 687 n2.
I ITALIAN CrVI CoDE art. 1329 (1) : "If the offeror binds himself to keep open the
offer for a certain period of time, revocation is not effective."
ITALiAx CIVIr. CoDE art. 1331: 'When the parties agree that the declared offer of
one of the parties shall be binding on himself but that the other party has the option
to accept it or refuse it, such declaration of the first party is considered as an irrevo-
cable offer with regard to the effects of Article 1329. If no time limit has been set
for acceptance, it may be set by the judge."
'ITALIAN CIVIL CODE of 1882 art. 36, para. 3.
4 JAEBIUCHER FUR DIE DoGuATin DES HEUTIGEN RomIsCHEN UND DEUTSCHEN
PRvATREcHTS (1861) ; Nussbaum, supra note 35, at 924; Longo, The Cornell Project
on the Common Core of Legal Systems: A View of a Civilian, 4 CoTJum. J. TaRAs-
NAT. L. 1, 11 n.20 (1965): "For example, in Italian law an offer is normally revocable,
but the offeree is compensated for loss and expenses sustained in 'bona-fide' reliance
on the offer."
Cour de Cas, 28.2.1870, D.P. 1871.1.61 (dictum); Nussbaum, mpra note 35, at
924.
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of the Uniform Commercial Code, with respect to commercial offers
for sale or purchase of goods.
B. Common Law Approach
At approximately the same date that the drafters of the Prussian
Code were elaborating the concept of an offer that is irrevocable for a
stated time, the English court was expressing the position, in the case
of Cooke v. Oxley,"0 that the seller is not bound by the acceptance of
his offer even though he had agreed to keep it open for a certain time
at the recipient's request. Application of the subjective theory of
contract formation, and the necessity for a consideration or a seal
to convert the promise into a binding option, restricted the develop-
ment of the irrevocable offer in England.
The influence of the subjective theory of contracts waned during
the last century,0 but the necessity of adequate formality of the
promise continued to restrict British judicial development correspond-
ing to that on the continent.0" Reliable information of revocation of
r 3 Term Rep. 653, 100 Eng. Rep. 785 (K.B. 1790).
03 By the time of Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250
(K.B. 1818), the courts had adopted the position that acceptance and offer made
inter absentes could be given effect to create a binding contract prior to the time of
communication. For discussion of the necessity of mutual assent in the common law
of contracts, see Ashley, Mutual Assent in Contract, 3 CoLum. L. REv. 71 (1903), in
SELECTED READINGS ON' THE LAw OF CONTRAcTS 114 (1931); Costigan, Implied-in-
fact Contracts and Mutual Assent, 33 HAv. L. REv. 376 (1920), in revised form in
SELECTED READINGS ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 144 (1931); Ferson, The Formation
of Simple Contracts, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 402 (1924), in revised form in SELECTED
READINGS oN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 128 (1931); Williston, Mutual Assent in the
Formation of Contracts, 14 ILL. L. REv. 85 (1919), in SELEcTED READINGS ON THE
LAw OF CONTRACTS 119 (1931).1 See, e.g., Head v. Diggon, [1828] 3 Man. & Ry. 97, 7 L.J.I.S. 36 (K-B.);
Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463; 45 L.J. Ch. 777 (C.A. 1876); Bristol, Cardig
& Swansea Aerated Bread Co. v. Maggs, 44 Ch. D. 616, 625, 59 L.J. Ch. 472 (1890):
It was suggested that the ten days during which the offer was to remain open
had not expired when it was withdrawn. But this can make no difference. The
offer was not a contract, and the term that it should remain open for ten days
was therefore not binding. It has often been held that such an offer may, not-
withstanding, be withdrawn within the time limited: [cases cited].
For commonwealth decisions see, e.g., Canada: Fraser v. Morrison, [1958] 12
D.L.R. 2d 612, 615:
Unless there was an acceptance by the owner (the defendants), and that
acceptance had been communicated to the plaintiffs, there could be no contract.
The 10-day clause did not make the offer to purchase binding on the plaintiffs
for that period because the offer in terms did not so provide and in any case
there was no consideration given on which such a contract could be founded.
The plaintiff therefore, had the right to cancel their offer to purchase any time
before acceptance by the defendants had been communicated to them.
Davis v. Shaw, [1910] 16 O.W.R. 273, 1 Ont. Weekly N. 991. Australia: Nyulasy v.
Rowan, [1891] 17 Vict. L.R. 663; New Zealand: Bray v. Murray, [1895] 13 N.Z.L.R.
184; South Africa: Garvie & Co. v. Wright, [1903] 20 S.C. 421.
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the offer did not have to be received directly from the offeror to be
legally effective.6"
The Second Restatement of Contracts (of which the sections on
contract formation were recently approved) recognizes the accepted
common law concept that an offeree's power of acceptance is terni-
nated when he receives from the offeror a manifestation of an intention
not to enter into the proposed contract,6 3 or when he acquires reliable
information that the offeror has taken, or will take, definite action
inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract . 4
This applies to commercial offers to sell and purchase goods as well as
to other forms of transactions. 5 There is often failure to take into
account the expectation of performance created by the assurance
expressed in the offer. A businessman may be inclined to place less
'See Dickinson v. Dodds, [1876] 2 Ch. D. 463, 45 L.J.Ch. 777 (C.A. 1876)(property sold to third party after offeror had promised the offeree that "This offer
to be held open until Friday at 9 a.m.'). In King v. Homer, [1914] 33 N.Z.L.R. 222(1913), there was an offer by appellants to permit respondent to hunt opposums on
appellant's land for a stated sum of money. Before the money was tendered respondent
learned that appellant had granted the right to a third party.
See RESTATEmENT (SECOND), CoNRAcTs § 41.
Id. at § 42.
For cases dealing with withdrawal of offer to sell before acceptance, see, e.g.,
Dura Chem. Co. v. Dalton-Cooper Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1951); Deibel
v. Kaufman, 44 Ohio L. Abs. 321, 62 N.E.2d 770 (1945) (corporate stock).
For cases dealing with withdrawal of offer to purchase before acceptance, see,
e.g., Imported Liquors Co. v. Los Angeles Liquor Co., 152 F.2d 549, 552 (9th Cir.
1945); Kelley v. Rouse, 188 Cal. App. 2d 92, 10 Cal. Rep. 235 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961);
Western Helicopter Operations Inc. v. Nelson, 118 Cal. App. 2d 359, 257 P.2d 1025(Dist. Ct. App. 1953); Transamerica Corp. v. Parrington, 115 Cal. App. 2d 346,
252 P.2d 385 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953) ; Podesta v. Mehrten, 57 Cal. App. 2d 66, 134
P.2d 38 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943); Baker v. Coleman, 160 Fla. 297, 34 So. 2d 538 (1948)(stock-majority of court were of the opinion that offeree failed to expressly accept
option within specified period); Leakey v. Duke, 77 Ga. App. 431, 48 S.E.2d 709
(1948) (jury question-offer to purchase beauty salon); Mathey v. Louis G. Free-
man Co., 295 Mass. 361, 3 N.E.2d 752 (1936) (machinery); Merit Specialties Co.
v. Gilbert Brass Foundry Co., 362 Mo. 325, 241 S.W.2d 718, 722 (1951); National
Cash Register Co. v. Lyon, 257 App. Div. 273, 13 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1939); Lou Nierenberg
Corp. v. C. Haedke & Co., 236 N.Y.S.2d 389 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Renne v. Volk, 188
Wis. 508, 205 N.W. 385 (1925) (farm lighting plant). But see J.W. Myers Comm'n
v. Cox, 197 Ark. 990, 125 S.W.2d 475, 477 (1939) (failure to withdraw offer to
purchase shipment of vegetables before acceptance); Local Trademarks v. Chupp, 82
Ga. App. 613, 61 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1950) (offer to purchase fifty advertising mats
was not withdrawn before acceptance).
The purchase order may provide that the offer will be effective unless it is revoked
by a stated date. See Nelson Equip. Co. v. Hamer, 191 Ore. 359, 230 P2d 188, 192
(1951): "The provision for cancellation was to enable the defendant to withdraw on
or prior to, but 'not later than 1 Jan. 49'."
For cases dealing with indirect communication of revocation, see, e.g., Threlkeld
v. Inglett, 289 Ill. 90, 124 N.E. 368 (1919); Giovanola v. Fort Lee Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n, 123 N.J. Eq. 103, 196 Atl. 357 (Ch. 1938) (dictum); Watters v. Lincoln,
29 S.D. 98, 135 N.W. 712 (1912); Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Clements Paper
Co., 193 Tenn. 6, 241 S.W.2d 851 (1951) ; Ant-wine v. Reed, 145 Tex. 521, 199 S.W.2d
482 (1947). See 1 CoaBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 40 (1963); Annot., Attempted revocation of
offer by letter -mailed or telegram filed before, but not received until after, letter or
telegram of acceptance was mailed or filed, 125 A.L.R. 989 (1940).
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importance upon the binding force of the legal concept of consideration
than upon commercial practice and usage within the trade.
To alleviate this difficulty, legislation has been enacted in a few
states, exemplified by New York,6 and, with respect to offers to buy
or sell goods, the principle of irrevocability has today been adopted
throughout most of the United States through the wide state enactment
of the UCC.
Section 2-205 of the UCC applies to the offer made by a merchant
to buy or to sell goods. Despite the lack of consideration, if the
merchant gives assurance in a signed writing, his offer will be held open
for any stated period, but not exceeding three months. If the signed
writing fails to specify the time for which the offer will be held open,
it will remain irrevocable for a reasonable time, again not exceeding
three months.67
While the offeree receiving a firm offer will usually be a merchant,
under the UCC it is the fact that the offeror is a merchant, usually a
dealer in goods of the kind involved,68 that is controlling. Although
oral communication, frequently by telephone, is recognized in commer-
cial practice as an established method of consummating contracts, the
'NEW YoRK PERS. PROP. LAW § 33(5) (McKinney 1962):
When hereafter an offer to enter into a contract is made in writing signed
by the offeror, or by his agent, which states that the offer is irrevocable during
a period set forth or until a time fixed, the offer shall not be revocable during
such period or until such time because of the absence of consideration for the
assurance or irrevocability. When such a writing states that the offer is ir-
revocable but does not state any period of time of irrevocability, it shall be
construed to state that the offer is irrevocable for a reasonable time.
The section was repealed upon adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, N.Y.
Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 553, effective Sept. 27, 1964.
See Jarka Corp. v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 182 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1950); Note, The
New York Statute on Irrevocable Offers, 43 CoLum. L. REv. 487 (1943).
' The fact that the signed writing gives assurance that it is irrevocable, that it is
not subject to cancellation, or that the offeror will not revoke the offer for a stated
period that exceeds three months, does not mean that such provision is to be given
no legal effect by the courts, but only that without consideration it is irrevocable
for a reasonable time under the circumstances which can not exceed three months.
This interpretation was suggested when the concept of an irrevocable offer to buy or
sell goods was first proposed in the early drafts of the Uniform Revised Sales Act
§ 18: "Commercial reason cannot recognize the total failure of a deliberate trans-
action merely because it has contemplated an engagement extending beyond the
period allowed by this section." Comment to UiFoR REVISED SALEs AcT § 18
(proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
" But the definition of the term "merchant" is not so limited. UCC § 2-104:(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by
his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the
practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or
skill may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other inter-
mediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or
skill.




UCC limits the application of this section on the firm offer to the
signed writing. The UCC also requires that the term of assurance
must be separately signed by the offeror where such term is on a form
supplied by the offeree. This is generally done by the offeror's placing
his initials in the margin adjacent to the pertinent language. 9 Thus,
a manufacturer's field representative may obtain the retail merchant's
signature on a printed purchase order form that precludes cancellation
by the buyer while leaving the manufacturer's acceptance subject to
home office approval, or the supplier may submit his irrevocable bid
on the form prescribed by the contractor.70
C. Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods
The marked difference in approach to the termination of the power
of acceptance by revocation of the offer in the civil law system, as
expressed in both Europe and Japan, and that of the common law
system, has been observed. This difference is evidenced again in the
proposed solution in the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods (Uniform International Act). The
1958 proposal ("Rome" draft) chose the civil law principle that an
offer that has arrived cannot be revoked unless it contains a reserva-
tion of such right.71 In effect, this proposal expressed the commercial
practice of using the German freibleibend clause, or its counterpart
See UCC § 2-205, comment 2. For pre-UCC decisions in which the purchaser
apparently placed his order with the seller's representative by means of execution of
the seller's'form see, e.g., Ludowici-Celadon Co. v. McKinley, 307 Mich. 149, 11
N.W.2d 839 (1943) (roofing tile, 30-day offer subject to approval of seller's executive
department) ; United Aluminum Corp. v. Argentiero, 48 Pa. D. & C. 559, 561 (Munic.
Ct. Phila. 1943) (aluminum ware-specification of exclusive territory satisfied
consideration requirement); Renne v. Volk, 188 Wis. 508, 205 N.W. 385 (1925)
(farm lighting plant-non-cancellable order subject to company's approval).
In Wilmington Trust Co. v. Coulter, 200 A.2d 441 (Del. 1964), the court refused
to apply UCC § 2-205, by analogy, to the sale of shares of stock held in trust by a
corporate trustee. But there were additional reasons for the court's refusal. See
Hogen, Sales, Bulk Transfers and Documents of Title, 20 Bus. LAw. 697, 698 (1965).
" See Schultz, The Firm Offer Puzzle: A Study of Business Practice in the
Construction Industry, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 236 (1952). See also Whitman, Incorpora-
tion by Reference in Commercial Contracts, 21 MD. L. REv. 1 (1961).
'UNIFORM INTmRNATIONAL ACT art. 4, para. 2 (1958 draft) (English translation
in 1958 YEARBOOK, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAws
127, 129):
An offer which has arrived may not be revoked unless the offeror has reserved
to himself the right of revocation in the offer. Tacit intention in this matter
shall only be taken into account by reason of the nature of the transaction or the
usages to which the offeror has made reference or which persons finding them-
selves in the situation of the offeror and the offeree consider to be generally
applicable.
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in other civil law systems. Under this proposal, the reservation could
be expressed or implied, either by the nature of the transaction or by
usage. The offer must refer to such usage or it must be commonly
considered applicable by persons in the same condition.
The drafters expressed concern that the effectiveness of the implied
reservation should not be measured by a subjective standard. If the
offeror resided in a country whose laws gave him the right of with-
drawing his offer without explicit reservation, as in common law
countries, it might be urged that, applying a subjective standard, there
is evidence of an implied will of the offeror to reserve a right of with-
drawal.72  With the abandonment of the civil law approach in the
current Uniform International Act there is no longer concern for an
objective standard to determine implied reservations.
The present proposal, drafted in 1964 and now submitted to member
governments for consideration and possible ratification, demonstrates
greater reliance on the common law approach. The offeror was for-
merly obligated to reserve a right of revocation, either explicitly or
implicitly; the present proposal allows revocation of the offer by
communication to the offeree, subject to stated exceptions.
The power of revocation must be exercised in good faith or in
conformity with fair dealing. It is precluded either until the expiration
of any stated fixed time for acceptance, or if the communicated offer
indicates that the offer is firm or irrevocable.73 These restrictions may
be either expressed, or implicit in the circumstances, or derived from
the preliminary negotiations or from practices established between the
parties, or based upon usage .7 Although these "exceptions" naturally
restrict the basic position of freedom of revocability of the offer,"
' Bagge, The Draft Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts of the Inter-
national Sale of Goods (Corporal Movables), in 1958 YEARBOOK, INIERNATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 47, 55, 57.
" UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT art. 5(2) (1964 draft): "After an offer has
been communicated to the offeree it can be revoked unless the revocation is not made
in good faith or in conformity with fair dealing or unless the offer states a fixed
time for acceptance or otherwise indicates that it is firm or irrevocable."
"'UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT art 5(3) (1964 draft) : "An indication that the
offer is firm or irrevocable may be express or implied from the circumstances, the
preliminary negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between
themselves or usage."
'UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL Act art 2(1) (1964 draft): "The provisions of the
following Articles shall apply except to the extent that it appears from the pre-
liminary negotiations, the offer, the reply, the practices which the parties have
established between themselves or usage, that other rules apply."
Cf. UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT art. 1(9) (1964 draft) : "Rules of private inter-
national law shall be excluded for the purpose of the application of the present Law,
subject to any provision to the contrary in the said Law."
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they indicate commercial practice and provide legal recognition for
the businessman's reliance on the firm offer.76
While the basic approach to the firm offer is similar in the UCC and
the Uniform International Act, in that both now provide that the
offeror has freedom of revocation without the necessity of reservation,
as well as that the right of revocation must be exercised in good faith,
there are secondary differences that should be noted.
The UCC requires that a firm offer be written and signed by the
offeror; the term itself must be signed separately by the offeror where
the form is supplied by the offeree. These formal requirements illustrate
the more rigid attitude in the common law. This is also exemplified by
the retention in the UCC of the Statute of Frauds requirement; neither
formality is included within the Uniform International Act.77
The international legislation refers to the offer that states a fixed
time for acceptance or otherwise indicates that it is firm or irrevocable,
whereas the UCC is directed to the terms of the offer that give assur-
ance that it will be held open. The statement of a fixed time for
acceptance, or of the irrevocability of the offer, will indeed usually
give assurance that it will be held open, but this is irrelevant to the
question of whether the offeror should be precluded from effectively
revoking his offer. Subject to equitable defense, the offeror should be
held to his statement. The drafters of the UCC limited its provision
expressly to the merchant's offer that is not supported by consideration.
Neither limitation is included in the Uniform International Act.
Finally, the UCC, in contrast with the Uniform International Act,
restricts the irrevocability of the firm offer to three months, thereby
excluding the long term option given without supporting consideration.
There is less need for this restriction in international trade, particularly
when the offer specifies an extended time for acceptance.
The civil law system is more protective of the offeree in this area
than is the common law system, but this protection is accomplished
at the expense of greater uncertainty, since there is a likelihood of
dispute over withdrawal of the offer before the expiration of a reason-
able time for acceptance.
A similar attitude is expressed in the general conditions prepared
by the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), under the auspices
of the United Nations, for use in international contracts; these con-
"Aubrey, The Formation of International Contracts, with Reference to the Uniform
Law on Formation, 14 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 1011, 1017-18 (1965).
'See UCC § 2-201; UmFoRm INTENATIOxAL ACT art. 3 (1964 draft). See also
UNIFORm LAW ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS art. 15.
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form to commercial practice as described by experts representing the
interests of both buyer and seller. ECE standard conditions that may
be incorporated into contracts for the sale of sawn softwood, citrus
fruit, solid fuels, and for the export and import of hardwood logs and
sawn hardwood from the temperate zone, permit revocation of any
except a firm offer.7" A similar recognition of commercial practice may
have influenced the modification of position from the 1958 to the 1964
drafts of the Uniform International Act. 9 An intermediate position is
expressed in the Italian Commercial Code, where only the offeree's
reliance interest is protected. 0
IV. EFFECT OF THE OFFEROR'S DEATH OR INCAPACITY ON
THE OFFEREE'S POWER OF ACCEPTANCE
In Japan the legal validity of a declaration of intention is not
affected by the declarant's death or his loss of mental capacity after
the notice has been dispatched."1 But in the case of an offer, which
is a declaration of intention, it is provided that the offer is effective
upon communication unless a contrary position had been expressed,
or unless the offeree learns of the death or loss of capacity before
arrival of the notice. 2 Once an offer is received by the offeree before
' Each of the following General Conditions include the phrase: "Any offer not de-
scribed as a firm offer shall not be deemed to be a binding offer." ECE, General Condi-
tions for Export and Import of Sawn Softwood, para. 2.3, U.N. Doc. No. ME/410/56
(1956) ; ECE, General Conditions for the Export and Import of Solid Fuels, para. B. 3
(slip note), U.N. Pub. Sales No. 59 II. E/Min. 1 (1958) ; ECE, General Conditions for
the International Sale of Citrus Fruits, para. 2.2, U.N. Pub. Sales No. 58 II.E/Min. 12
(No. 312) (1958) ; ECE, General Conditions for the Export and Import of Hardwood
Logs and Sawn Hardwood From the Temperate Zone, para. 2.3 (No. 420) (1961). The
ECE conditions for plant and machinery do not include a provision with regard to the
offeror's right to revoke his offer. Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Con-
tracts: Three Attempts at Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 316 (1962).
' Undoubtedly the change in emphasis was directly influenced by the fact that the
United States delegation actively participated in the 1964 drafting sessions, whereas
formerly their role had been that of an invited observer. For the background history
on The Hague Convention of 1964, see Honnold, The Uniform Law for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods: The Hague Convention of 1964, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB.
326, 329-32 (1965).
"' ITALIAN CIxVII CODE Of 1882, art. 36, para. 3. In sale of goods transactions these
expenses incurred in reliance upon the offer remaining open may include the cost of
packing, storage, freight, brokerage fees, or purchase of related raw materials by
the buyer-offeree, the clearing of stock by the seller-offeree, the rejection of other
offers, and his making additional offers. See Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the
Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance Doctine, 36 COLUm. L. REv. 920, 925 (1936).
"'JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 97(2):
The validity of a declaration of intention shall not be affected, even if the
declarant dies or loses his capacity after he has despatched the notice.
JAPANESE CivrL CODE art. 525:
The provision of Article 97 paragraph 2 shall not apply in cases where the
offeror has declared an intention to the contrary or where the other party was
aware of his death or of his loss of capacity.
See Corbin, Offer and Acceptance and Some of the Resulting Legal Relations,
26 YALE L.J. 169, 186 n.29 (1916).
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the offeror's death or incapacity, neither event itself precludes the
offeree's power of acceptance, unless the offer is of a personal charac-
ter.83 This position is to be compared first with that of the European
civil law and then with that developed by the common law.
In Germany, unless the agreement is personal, the conclusion of an
effective contract is not prevented by death or incapacity, either in
the sense of bankruptcy or of loss of mental capacity, before accept-
ance. Article 130, paragraph 2 of the German Civil Code (BGB)
provides that the death of the offeror or his loss of capacity before
acceptance does not preclude effective acceptance before the expiration
of the time allotted by the terms of the offer.84 A similar viewpoint is
contained in the Italian Civil Code.8
French jurisprudence, on the other hand, holds that the offer termin-
ates by operation of law if it is not accepted before the death of the
offeror. This position stems from the view that offers of donations are
considered personal to the offeror s6 This interpretation is also perti-
nent, in the view of most French authors, when the offeror becomes so
incapacitated before acceptance that he no longer retains a juridically
effective will.
8 7
The French Council of State, however, recognizes the exception of
competitive bids made by individuals to the State for the construction
of public works. The State is not explicitly required to accept such
offers; consequently, they are not automatically terminated upon the
offeror's death or incapacity.88
'See ISHIDA, SAIKEN KAKURON 6 (1955); 5(1) WAGATSUmA, SAIHEN KAKURON
58 (1954).8
,Cohn, Cizil Law, in 1 GREAT BRITAIN FoREIGN OFFICE MANUAL OF GERMAN
LAw 50, § 159 (1950).
' ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 1329: "If the offeror binds himself to keep open the
offer for a certain period of time, revocation is not effective. In such case, the death
or supervening legal incapacity of the offeror does not affect the validity of the
offer, unless such validity is barred by the nature of the transaction or other cir-
cumstances."
'Cass. 21.4.1891, S. 95.1.398; D. 1892.1.181; 2 PLANIOL, TRAIr tLtMENTAIRE
DE DROIT CIVIL, n* 980 (11th ed. 1939). Cf. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 1810 (Vest
1952) : "If the party making the offer, died before it is accepted, or he to whom it is
made, die before he has given his assent, the representatives of neither party are
bound, nor can they bind the survivor;" Union Sawmill Co. v. Mitchell, 122 La.
900, 48 So. 317, 318 (1909) (proposal to purchase standing timber).
See AUBRY & RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 343, at 482-83 (5th ed. 1902) ; 12
BAUDRY-LAcANTINERIE no 31 (3d ed. 1906); 24 DEMOLOMBRE, COURT DU CODE CIVIL,
nn* 63, 69, 70 (2d ed. 1870) ; 15 LAURENT, DROiT CIVm FRArcAis, n* 478 (1875) ; 6
PLANIOL ET RIPERT, DROIT CIVIL FRANcAis, no 140 (1930); 3 POTHIER, OEUVRES, no
32 (new ed. 1821) ; 6 TourmER, DRorr CIVL FRANCAIS n0 31 (4th ed. 1824) ; Papale,
The Effect of Death in Pre-Confract Negotiations, 4 LoYoLA L. REv. 109 (1948).
' Conseil d'Etat, 3 Aug. 1900, S. 1903.3.13; Dalloz, Lois politiques et administra-
tives, T. III, p. 673, No. 10119; 2 PLANIOL, op. cit. supra note 86, at n* 970.
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The common law system terminates the offeree's power of accept-
ance when either he or the offeror dies or is deprived of legal capacity
to enter into the proposed contract.89 The disposition of the outstand-
ing offer following death has been the subject of considerable legal
writing that is critical of the view that contract formation requires a
subjective meeting of the mindsY During the past century this has
given way, in many areas of the common law, to an objective test of
reasonable expectation. Indeed, during the drafting state of the origi-
nal Restatement of Contracts in the mid-1920's it was initially pro-
posed in articles 35 and 48 that death did not automatically revoke the
offer. Although most of the advisers favored this proposition, it was
disapproved by the majority of the Council of the American Law
Institute. At the instance of the Council, the Restatement section was
altered to read that with stated exceptions the offeror's death, or
insanity that deprived him of contractual capacity, terminated the
offer."' Williston, who served as Reporter for the Restatement of Con-
tracts, stated his belief that lawyers were then generally of the opinion
that death, even if unknown, revokes an offer as well as an agency.92
But he readily conceded that there was only limited authority for this
conclusion.
"ESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS §§ 35(1)(d). See Chain v. Wilhelm,
84 F.2d 138, 140 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 299 U.S. 531 (1936), rev'd on other grounds,
300 U.S. 31 (1937); Bard v. Kent, 19 Cal. 2d 449, 122 P.2d 8 (1942), 139 A.L.R.
1032; Shaw v. King, 63 Cal. App. 18, 218 Pac. 50 (Dist Ct. App. 1923) (promise to
support offeree for life) ; Ritchie v. Rawlings, 106 Kan. 118, 186 Pac. 1033 (1920)(division of property); New Headley Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Gentry's Ex'r,
307 Ky. 857, 212 S.W.2d 325 (1948); Union Sawmill Co. v. Mitchell, 122 La. 900,
48 So. 317 (1909).
For cases from England and the British Commonwealth see Reynolds v. Atherton,
125 L.T.R.(n.s.) 690 (C.A. 1921), aff'd, [1922] L.T.R. 189 (death of offeror); Dickin-
son v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463, 45 L.J. Ch. 777 (C.A. 1876) (death of offeror) ; Meynell
v. Surtees, 25 L.J. Ch. 257, 25 L.T. O.S. 227 (1855) (death of offeror); Reynolds v.
Atherton, supra (death of offeree) ; Carter v. Hyde, [1923] C.L.R. 115, 24 R.N.S.W.
340 (Australia: consideration given for option) (death of offeree).
' See, e.g., 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 54 (1963); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,§ 62 (3d ed. 1959) Ferson, Does the Death of an offeror Nullify His Offer?, 10 MINNr.
L. REv. 152 (1920); Parks, Attempted Acceptance of a Deceased Offeror's Offer, 29
MICE. L. REV. 201 (1920) ; Papale, The Effect of Death in Pre-Contract Negotia-
tions, 4 LOYOLA L. REv. 109 (1948); Parks, Indirect revocation and Termination of
Offers by Death, 19 lIcEr. L. REv. 152 (1920) ; Parks, Attempted Acceptance of a
Deceased Offeror's Offer, 29 U. Mo. BULL. L. Smr. 5 (1928) ; Note, 24 COLUm. L. REV.
294 (1924); Note, 54 DIcK. L. REv. 482 (1950); Comment, 23 FoRDEAm L. Rv.
340 (1954). See also Corbin, Offer ad Acceptance, and Some of the Resulting Legal
Relations, 26 YALE LJ. 169, 198-99 (1916).
" RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §35(1)(f) (1932). RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§
45-47 (1932) are exceptions to § 35 (1) (f).
23 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AmamIcAm LA-v INSTITUTE 198-99 (1925). Cf. Note,
Offers and Acceptance in Contracts by Correspondence, 59 YALE L.J. 374, 376 (1950)(limited field study as to the attitude of business concerns in Connecticut as to the
time of effective acceptance of the outstanding offer).
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The Second Restatement of Contracts perpetuates this doctrine,93
although the Comment describes the rule, viz., that the offeror's death
terminates the power of acceptance of the offeree despite his lack of
knowledge, as "a relic of the obsolete view that a contract requires a
'meeting of minds,' and it is out of harmony with the modern doctrine
that a manifestation of assent is effective without regard to actual
mental assent."94
The common law view is founded on the proposition that it is impli-
cit in the nature of an offer that it is made subject to the contingency
that the parties will live, and that death terminates the negotiations."
This argument is only realistic when the offer is subject, by its nature,
to the condition that one or both of the parties remain alive. Commer-
cial contracts are rarely so contingent, and the business community
cannot assume the existence of this contingency as a valid guideline.
If requested acts are performed in ignorance of the offeror's death,
the common law position that death terminates the offeree's power of
acceptance is patently untenable. Obviously a sale, a loan, or an exten-
sion of service may be made in reliance upon a promise of guarantee,
in ignorance of the promisor's death. An effort to accept the offer of
guarantee in this manner is distinct from mere expression of assent by
correspondence. The distinction should rest upon whether the effort
at acceptance is actually made without knowledge of the offeror's
death, rather than on the manner of acceptance. Nevertheless there is
less objection to a refusal to give effect to the acceptance made without
knowledge of the death when the offeree has not materially changed
his position in reliance on an effective contract.9 6
There are a few instances where the death of the guarantor (no
notification of which was given to the guarantee) did not revoke the
guaranty,97 although this is certainly not the generally accepted posi-
tion.98 Courts have not been solicitous of the position of the business-
man who extends value in ignorance of the guarantor's death. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS §§ 35 (1) (d), 48.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 48, comment a.
"See Parks, Indirect Revocation and Termination by Death of Offers, 19 MICH.
L. REv. 152 (1920) ; Parks, Attempted Acceptace of a Deceased Offeror's Offer, 29
U. Mo. BULL. L. SER. 5 (1928). But cf. Ferson, Does the Death of the Offeror
Nulify His Offer?, 10 MiNN. L. REv. 373 (1926).
11 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 54, at 229 (1963).
"Menard v. Scudder, 7 La. Ann. 385 (1852); Bradbury v. Morgan, 1 H.&C.
249, 158 Eng. Rep. 877 (Ex. 1862) ; 12 C.B. (n.s.) 748, 142 Eng. Rep. 1336 (Ex. 1862)
(counsel adverted to Bradbury v. Morgan, supra, but it was not referred to by the
courts). See Note, 24 COLUm. L. Rr v. 294, 296 n.12 (1924).
1 See Annot., Guarantor's death as terminating guaranty, 42 A.L.R. 926, 933-35
(1926).
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judiciary has observed that "it is no hardship to require traders, whose
business it is to deal in goods, to exercise diligence so far as to ascer-
tain whether a person upon whose credit they are selling is living."99
The courts have in fact at times become overindulgent in their desire
to protect the estate of the deceased. 00
At the international level, it is clear that drafting an acceptable
provision for the Uniform International Act regarding the effects pro-
duced by the death or incapacity of the offeror or offeree is difficult,
due to the divergent positions of the various legal systems. Countries
following the common law approach terminate the offeree's power of
acceptance of the bare offer upon the occurrence of any of these
events; whereas some of the civil law countries, exemplified by Ger-
many,1 1 provide that neither death nor incapacity of one of the parties
precludes the right, where it is otherwise available, to establish a con-
tractual relationship. The latter concept has found acceptance due to
a desire to assure the certainty of business transactions and to avoid
for commercial concerns the difficulties that might result from death
or incapacity. There is also an intermediate position that examines
the possibly necessary detrimental reliance of the offeree in attempting
to accept the offer without knowledge of the offeror's death or incapa-
city.10 2
The 1936 draft of the Uniform International Act proposed as a
solution that the question of the possible lapse of an offer upon the
offeror's death or incapacity depend upon whether the offer prescribed
a time for acceptance.0 3 The "Rome" draft of 1958 abandoned this
distinction, stipulating instead that should the death of the offeror or
his incapacity to contract result in the cessation of the activity to
which the offer was attached, the offer could be revoked without undue
'Jordon v. Dobbins, 122 Mass. 168, 23 Am. Rep. 305, 307 (1877), quoted with
approval in L. Teplitz Thrown Silk Co. v. Rich, 13 N.J. Misc. 494, 179 Atl. 305,
306 (Cir. Ct. 1935).
' Aitken v. Lang's Adm'r, 106 Ky. 652, 51 S.W. 154, 155 (1899), quoted with
approval in L. Teplitz Thrown Silk Co. v. Rich, supra note 99, 179 At. at 306:
"This notice might not be received for a long time, as the real and personal
representatives of the deceased might be ignorant of the guaranty, and in the mean-
time the estate might be bankrupted."
" This is apparently the view that has been adopted in Japan. See notes 81 & 83
supra and accompanying text.
. For discussion of the three categories see Meijers, Underlying Principles of
the Draft Concerning the Conchtsion of Contracts by Correspondence in Unification
of Law, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 71, 75(1948).
" International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Preliminary Draft
of a Uniform Law on International Contracts Made by Correspondence, in 1 UNIFI-
CATION OF LAW 161, 163, art. 4 (1948) (English translation).
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delay."°4 This has been further modified in the present formulation so
that article 11 now establishes that the formation of the contract is
not affected by the death of one of the parties or by his becoming
incapable of contracting before acceptance. This basic position, how-
ever, is subject to the contrary intention of the parties, to usage, and
to the nature of the transaction.0 5 Thus the position proposed in the
Uniform International Act has shifted from an initial attitude basically
favoring the common law view,'0 6 to an ultimate attitude that affords
greater protection to the offeree as in many civil law jurisdictions.
V. MANNER OF ACCEPTANCE
Advanced legal systems uniformly adopt the position that the offeror
has the power to control the manner in which his offer is to be ac-
cepted. 1 7 He may prescribe the exact manner of acceptance, he may
allow the offeree alternate methods of acceptance, or he may omit
any reference to a prescribed method of acceptance thereby enabling
the offeree to accept in any manner reasonable under the circum-
stances.
In commercial transactions, offers to purchase that are solicited by
a manufacturer's or distributor's sales representative are frequently
subject to approval by the home office, permitting supervisory control
over the field representative as well as over the flow of orders to be
filled and the limit of credit to be extended. 8 Failure to obtain such
approval may preclude the consummation of a contract.0 9
'
0 1UNIFORM INTERNAToINAL Acr art. 4 (1958 draft).
UNIFORM INTERNrATioNAL ACT. art. 11 (1964 draft): "The formation of the
contract is not affected by the death of one of the parties or by his becoming in-
capable of contracting before acceptance unless the contrary results from the intention
of the parties, usage or the nature of the transaction."
'-°Meijers, supra note 102, at 77: "In view of these different systems, the Com-
mittee felt that agreement could only be reached on the English principle that death
counts revocation."
'The Restatement of Contracts, following the distinction between bilateral and
unilateral contracts, adopted the position as expressed in § 31 that in case of doubt
it was presumed that the offer invited the formation of a bilateral contract by an
acceptance amounting in effect to a promise by the offeree to perform rather than a
unilateral contract necessitating actual performance. An analysis based upon a
bilateral/unilateral classification has been subject to justifiable criticism. See
Stoljar, The False Distinction Between Bilateral and Unilateral Contracts, 64 YALE
L.J. 515 (1955). It is now proposed that the distinction be abolished. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS, Reporter's Note § 12 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1964);
Braucher, Offer and Acceptance in the Second Restatement, 74 YALE L.J. 302, 304
(1964).
'Armor Insulating Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 11 Ga. App. 672, 31 S.E.2d
880, 884-85 (1944), is an example of the use of home office approval of the sales
representatives purchase orders to control the extent to which goods will be supplied
to the purchaser on credit:
The order was never released from the credit department; we advised Armor
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A principal, receiving notice of an order solicited by his agent, may
become legally bound by failing to repudiate the order within a reason-
able time."' A preferable position limits this effect of the principal's
silence to situations where there have been prior similar business
transactions between the parties or other justifiable bases for imposing
an obligation upon the principal to communicate his decision."' The
principal's silence in this situation is distinct from his act of shipping
the ordered goods. The requirement in the order that it shall not be
binding unless accepted in writing by the principal is waived by ship-
ment of the requested goods, especially where the buyer has accepted
delivery." 2 And the approval of the home office sufficient to bind the
Insulating Company that when payment for the past due account was received,
the order in question would be released as far as credit was concerned; until an
order is approved by the credit department nothing can be done on it by way
of sending it to the mill for fabrication; the first step taken with an order is
submission to the credit department for approval; at the time Armor asked for
immediate delivery the order was still unacceptable because the past due ac-
count had not been paid.
" Truscon Steel Co. v. Cooke, 98 F.2d 905 (10th Cir. 1938); Bishop v. Swift
& Co., 234 Ala. 326, 174 So. 488 (1937) ; King v. Atlanta Oak Flooring Co., 71 Ga.
App. 292, 30 S.E.2d 646 (1944); W. & J. Sloane Selling Agents v. Tampa Chair &
Table Co., 53 Ga. App. 609, 186 S.E. 761 (1936); B.A. Eckhart Milling Co. v.
Illinois Doughnut & Cake Co., 314 Ill. App. 196, 40 N.E.2d 826 (1942) (abstract
only); Oliver Farm Equip. Sales Co. v. Waiters, 109 Ind. App. 551, 37 N.E.2d 9(1941); Hargrove v. Crawford, 159 Iowa 522, 141 N.W. 423 (1913); Kuzmeskus v.
Pickup Motor Co., 330 Mass. 490, 115 N.E.2d 461 (1953) (order to purchase
buses cancelled before acceptance by defendant bus dealer); Application of Glazer
Steel Corp., 86 N.Y.S.2d 335 (Sup. Ct. 1948) ; McCrea v. Automatic Heat, Inc., 161
Pa. Super. 545, 55 A.2d 564 (1947) ; Garrett v. International Milling Co., 223 S.W.2d 67
(Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Sell v. General Elec. Supply Corp. 227 Wis. 242, 278 N.W. 442(1938).
"'Bu Grass Cordage Co. v. Luthy, 98 Ky. 583, 33 S.W. 835 (1896); Welch v.
Bombardieri, 252 Mass. 84, 87, 147 NE 595 (1925) ; Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v.
Holloway, 141 Tenn. 697, 214 S.W. 817 (1919); Peterson v. Graham-Brown Shoe Co.,
210 S.W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919); Hendrickson v. International Harvester Co.
of America, 100 Vt. 161, 135 At. 702 (1927) ; 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 5(b) (rev. ed.
1948).
' Lang & Gros. Mfg. Co. v. Ft. Wayne Corrugated Paper Co., 278 F. 483 (7th
Cir. 1921); Sturdivant v. Mt. Dixie Sanitarium, Land & Inv. Co., 197 Ala. 280,
72 So. 502 (1916) ; Lewis A. Crossett Co. v. American Polish Corp., 97 Conn. 485,
117 AtI. 415 (1922); Port Huron Mach. Co. v. Wohlers, 207 Iowa 826, 221 N.W.
843 (1928); Columbia Weighing Mach. Co. v. Vaughan, 123 Kan. 474, 255 Pac. 973(1927); Hercules Mfg. Co. v. Wallace, 124 Miss. 27, 86 So. 706 (1921); Monarch
Portland Cement Co. v. P... Creedon & Sons, 94 Neb. 185, 142 N.W. 906 (1913);
1 WILLISTON, SALES, § 5(b) (rev. ed. 1948); Annot., Effect of delay of principal in
disapproving or rejecting orders for goods taken by agent subject to approval,
7 A.L.R. 1686 (1920).
"2 For cases where the buyer was precluded from effectively relying upon seller's
failure to approve purchase order when specified goods were delivered and accepted
see, e.g., Pratt-Gilbert Co. v. Renaud, 25 Ariz. 79, 213 Pac. 400, 403 (1923): "It is
a strange contention that the promise to do should be considered as of more im-
portance and acceptable than the fulfillment of the promise." Columbia Weighing
Mach. Co. v. Vaughan, 123 Kan. 474, 255 Pac. 973 (1927) ; Electric Neon Clock Co.




seller has on occasion consisted merely of the seller's communicated
assurance that the order will receive "our very best attention.""1 3 The
effect of such an expression must be measured in terms of the reliance
that it may induce under the particular circumstances. 4 The contract-
ing parties may have established a course of dealing in which the
acknowledgement takes on more significance than a mere formality. 1
The merchant seller may on occasion be charged with the duty to
communicate his decision regarding offers solicited by his sales repre-
sentative. If he fails to do so, his silence may result in a forced accept-
ance,"16 especially where a deposit has been solicited and submitted,
Hill's, Inc. v. William B. Kessler, Inc., 41 Wn. 2d 42, 43-44, 246 P.2d 1099,
1100 (1952), citing with approval the following quotation from Bauman v. Mclfanus,
75 Kan. 106, 89 Pac. 15, 18 (1907) (Emphasis added.):
The promise that the order shall receive prompt and careful attention seems to
imply something more than that the manufacturers will quickly and cautiously
investigate the advisability of accepting it .... The engagement to use care
seems more naturally to relate to the manner of filling the order than to the
settling of a doubt whether to fill it at all. The expression of thanks for the
favor has some tendency in the same direction. We incline strongly to the
opinion that the letter, standing by itself, was as effectual to close a contract as
though in set phrase it had said that the goods would be shipped; that to permit
any other construction to be placed upon it would be to countenance the studied
use of equivocal expressions, with a set purpose, if an advantage may thereby be
derived, to keep the word of promise to the ear and break it to the hope.
In the Hill's decision acceptance of the offer was also shown by subsequent corre-
spondence with the plaintiff purchaser.
"In Krohn-Fechheimer Co. v. Palmer, 282 Mo. 82, 221 S.W. 353 (1920), the
offeror upon receipt of such letter of assurance promptly sent a letter revoking his
offer. But the seller's attempt to cancel the order two months after having given its
"assurance" and at a date that was too late for the offeror-purchaser to procure sub-
stitute goods may constitute a breach of contract. See Hill's, Inc. v. William B
Kessler, Inc., supra note 113; Bauman v. McManus, supra note 113; RESTATEMENT
(SECOND), CoNmAcrs § 58, illustrations 1,2.
' Calcasieu Paper Co. v. Memphis Paper Co., 32 Tenn. App. 293, 222 S.W.2d
617, 621 (1949) :
In the instant case we are not dealing, however, with one isolated transaction
where we are confined to the document itself on which the parties have never
acted.
On the contrary, we have a long course of dealing and many like transactions
over the years where merchandise has invariably been delivered on this form of
document without further communication between the parties.
For annotation of cases see Annot., Acknowledging receipt of order for goods as
an acceptance completing the contiact, 10 A.L.R. 683 (1921).
'pE.g., Enterprise Mfg. Co. v. Campbell, 121 S.W. 1040, 1041 (Ky. 1909) : "After
appellant accepted the cash payment of $100 from appellees, we think it was incumbent
upon it within a reasonable time either to accept or reject the order. Appellant
could not keep appellees' money for an unreasonable length of time, and then claim
that it never accepted the order." In Blue Grass Cordage Co. v. Luthy, 98 Ky. 583,
33 S.W. 835 (1896), an order for twine submitted by salesman to cordage company
on May 9, 1892, was rejected by the company and the offeror notified on fay 21,
1892; Sacks v. McNamara Buick-Pontiac, Inc., 226 N.Y.S.2d 34, 36 (Suffolk City
Ct. 1962) ; Peterson v. Graham-Brown Shoe Co., 210 S.W. 737 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919);
Hendrickson v. International Harvester Co. of America, 100 Vt. 161, 135 Atl. 702, 705
(1927):
And true it is that it is frequently said that one is ordinarily under no obliga-
tion to do or say anything concerning a proposition which he does not choose to
accept; yet we think that, when one sends out an agent to solicit orders for his
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or where there exists between the parties a course of dealing established
by a series of similar transactions." 7 A like position is expressed in the
Japanese Commercial Code. There, the trader who receives an offer
from a person with whom he maintains regular business relations to
enter into a contract that is within the scope of his business, must
dispatch his notice of rejection without delay or he will be deemed to
have accepted the offer.11
Some of the trade associations representing the interests of both
sellers and buyers have agreed upon the incorporation of a standard
provision into order forms that unless the seller gives notice within a
specified period, the submitted order will be considered accepted.
Exemplary of such a standardized provision is that agreed upon be-
tween the National Retail Dry Goods Association and the Trade
Council of the Garment Association." 9
In civil law systems, acceptance of commercial offers by reason of
the recipient's silence is recognized in other circumstances. An offer
may be made with the reservation that the offeror will not be bound by
goods, authorizing such agent to take such orders subject to his (the principal's)
approval, fair dealing and the exigencies of modem business require us to hold
that he shall signify to the customer within a reasonable time from the receipt
of the order his rejection of it, or suffer the consequences of having his silence
operate as an approval.
1 UCC § 1-205(1): "A course of dealing is a sequence of previous conduct
between the parties to a particular transaction which is fairly to be regarded as
establishing a common basis of understanding for interpreting their expression and
other conduct."
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND), CONTRACTs § 72. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of
Dominion.
(1) Where an offeree fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate
as an acceptance in the following cases and in no others:...
(c) Where because of previous dealings or otherwise, it is reasonable that
the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not intend to accept
Illustration 5;
A, through salesmen, has frequently solicited orders for goods from B, the
orders to be subject to A's personal approval. In every case A has shipped the
goods ordered within a week and without other notification to B than billing the
goods to him on shipment. A's salesman solicits and receives another order from
B. A receives the order and remains silent. B relies on the order and forbears
to buy elsewhere for a week. A is bound to fill the order.
' JAPANESE CO ERCIAL CODE art. 509:
In cases [where] a trader has received an offer to enter into a contract which falls
within any of the branches of the business carried on by him from a person with
whom he is in regular business relations, he shall without delay despatch notice of
acceptance or rejection. If he has neglected to despatch such notice, he shall be
deemed to have accepted the offer.
... Basic trade provisions of 1949: "1. It is mutually agreed and understood that
all the terms and conditions set forth on this order are satisfactory unless the Seller
notifies Purchaser to the Contrary, before shipment is made, within 15 days from
the date of this order."




it (freibleibend); should the offeree communicate his acceptance of
such a restricted offer, the offeror's silence will normally be construed
as indicating his intention to consummate a contract. 20
These are exceptional circumstances, however, for in many commer-
cial transactions it would be unreasonable to force a duty of negative
communication upon the seller. This attitude is reflected in much of
the reported commercial litigation involving rejected offers for the sale
of goods.' 2 '
Thus, there is considerable flexibility in the manner of effectively
accepting a commercial offer, and unless otherwise indicated by either
the language of the offer or the circumstances, acceptance is invited
in any manner and by any reasonable medium. 22 The terms of the
offer to purchase goods or the nature of the transaction may indicate
that the goods are to be shipped promptly or that they are ordered for
current shipment. In these circumstances the buyer is normally not
concerned with the advance receipt of commitment from the seller.
Unless the buyer's order expressly limits the manner of acceptance of
goods ordered for prompt or current shipment, the seller adopts a
reasonable method of acceptance when he either makes prompt or
current shipment, or promptly promises to make such shipment. 12 3
'Daniels, The German Law of Sales, 6 Ama. J. Comp. LAW 471, 480 (1957);
"[German Civil Code (BGB)] para. 151 provides that the acceptance does not have to
be communicated to the offeror when under the circumstances or in accordance with
the practice of the trade an answer is not expected."
For case annotation see Annot., Silence when offer is inade or failure to reject
it as acceptance which will consummate a bilateral contract, 77 A.L.R. 1141 (1932) ;
Annot., Effect of delay of principal in disapproving or rejecting orders for goods
taken by agent subject to approval, 7 A.L.R. 1686 (1920). See Royal Ins. Co. v.
Beatty, 119 Pa. 6, 9, 12 Atl. 607 (1888), quoted with approval in Cohen v. Johnson,
91 F. Supp. 231, 236 (M.D. Pa. 1950) :
While it must be conceded that circumstances may exist which will impose a
contractual obligation by mere silence, yet it must be admitted that such cir-
cumstances are exceptional in their character, and of extremely rare occurrence
... it is difficult to understand how a legal liability can arise out of the mere
silence of the party sought to be affected, unless he was subject to a duty of
speech, which was neglected, to the harm of the other party. If there was no
duty of speech, there could be no harmful omission arising from mere silence.
m UCC §2-206 (1) (a) ; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRAcTs § 29(2).
'This position is adopted in UCC § 2-206 (1) (b). Although the language of
this subsection refers to "inviting acceptance ... by a prompt promise to ship" this
is to be interpreted as a prompt promise to ship promptly for the buyer's request, for
prompt shipment is not satisfied by a prompt promise to ship at some later date.
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV.
L. REv. 561, 577 (1950) :
Obviously, a prompt promise to ship the goods eventually should not serve as an
acceptance of an order to "ship at once," stated as illustrative in Comment 3. I
assume the draftsman means a "prompt promise to ship promptly" or at any
rate within a brief reasonable time, though neither the section or the Comment
indicates this. Perhaps it is intended that a general promise, interpreted as
performable within a reasonable time is sufficient.
See also RESTATEMENT (SEcowD), CONTRACTS § 31: "Invitation of Promise or
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Sometimes, offers for the purchase of goods can not be filled by
current shipment; it may be necessary for the seller to either acquire
or manufacture the goods requested. Or an offer may request some
other form of performance. Whenever the commencement of requested
performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance, the UCC requires
that the offeror must be notified of the acceptance within a reasonable
time. -12 4 The UCC does not indicate the circumstances in which begin-
ning the requested performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance,
other than to suggest that the contract may be established by the
conduct by both parties which recognizes its existence. 125 This con-
trasts with the more specific declaration in the civil codes of Europe
126
Performance. In case of doubt an offer is interpreted as inviting the offeree to
accept either by promising to perform what the offer requests or by rendering the
performance, as the offeree chooses." See id. at Illustrations 5 and 6 involving
orders for goods requesting prompt shipment
Illustrative is Columbia Weighing Mach. Co. v. Vaughan, 123 Kan. 474, 255 Pac.
973, 974 (1927) :
Defendant argues that there is a radical distinction, in regard to communica-
tions, between offers which ask that the offeree do something and offers which
ask that the offeree promise something, and that in offers of the former kind
communication of the acceptance is ordinarily not required, while in the offers
of the latter kind communication of the acceptance is always essential, citing
13 C.J. 284. The cases cited in support of the text are not offers of the kind we
have before us. There may very well be an offer of a promise to do, the accep-
tance of which does not require, or contemplate, immediate action, but only a
promise of future action. Such an offer could be accepted only by the offeror
making the promise, since no immediate action is required of him. But this is
not the case before us. Here defendant offered to buy a machine, not at some
time in the future, but to make a present purchase, with the understanding,
which means upon the conditions, stated in the order, and to pay therefor the
sum named in payments and at the time stated in the order. Plaintiff, by ship-
ping the machine, accepted the offer, and thereby the offer became a contract,
the terms and conditions of which became binding on both parties.
See also Moore v. Scott Stamp & Coin Co., 178 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1949) (postage
stamps purchased by the plaintiff in China at the defendant's request and shipped by
registered mail addressed to the defendant); Port Huron Mach. Co. v. Wohlers, 207
Iowa 826, 221 N.W. 843 (1928) (order for farm machinery for current shipment
shipped to purchaser two days before receipt of telegram attempting to revoke the
order). In Calcasieu Paper Co. v. Memphis Paper Co., 32 Tenn. App. 293, 222
S.W.2d 617 (1949), the "Acknowledgment of Order" was printed across the order
form for purchase of paper; the parties over a long course of dealing had delivered
and received merchandise on such form of document without any further communica-
tion.
For discussion of shipment of non-conforming goods, see text accompanying notes
139 through 145 infra.
'-UCC § 2-206(2).
'-UCC §2-204(1). For annotation of pre-UCC cases see Annot., Acting on
order for goods as an acceptance thereof, 29 A.L.R. 1352 (1924), supplementing
Annot, 19 A.L.R. 476 (1922).
E.g., ITALiAN CrviL CODE art. 1327. Acceptance by performance:
When the performance is to be made without a previous reply to the offer
because this is requested by the offeror or because it is implied from the nature
of the transaction or because of custom, the contract is completed at the time and
place of the commencement of such execution.
The party accepting shall promptly notify the other party of the commencement
of the performance, and is otherwise liable in damages.
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and Japan, 2' as well as in the Uniform International Act.' 28
The offeree may accept an offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment by prompt delivery of the ordered goods to a carrier, and
this may be considered the beginning of requested performance. This
manner of acceptance will come to the offeror's attention in normal
course, and the obligation of notifying the offeror of acceptance by
beginning performance should not be interpreted as including current
shipments. 29
Although the civil law and the UCC require that the offeror be
notified of acceptance within a reasonable time following the com-
mencement of the requested performance, they differ as to the legal
consequence of failure to comply. The UCC and the Second Restate-
ment of Contracts, although differing in the manner of expression,
completely discharge any existing or potential contractual duty of the
offeror.'3  In contrast, in the civil law of Italy the offeree who fails to
' JAPANESE CiviL CODE art. 526 (2) :
In cases where no notice of acceptance is necessary either by reason of a
declaration of intention to that effect by the offeror or by reason of business
usage, the contract comes into existence at the time when any event takes place
which can be taken as a declaration of intention to accept.
See also 5(1) WAGATSUMA, op. cit. supra note 83, at 71.
UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT art. 6 (1964 draft) :(1) Acceptance of an offer consists of a declaration communicated by any
means whatsoever to the offeror.(2) Acceptance may also consist of the despatch of the goods or of the price or
of any other act which may be considered to be equivalent to the declaration
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article either by virtue of the offer or as a result
of practices which the parties have established between themselves or usage.
"UCC § 2-206(2) should be interpreted as applying to the beginning of re-
quested performance other than prompt or current shipment under UCC § 2-206(1)(b). In most commercial transactions shipment will be under reservation and thus
the buyer will learn of the seller's acceptance by means of shipment by the time of
arrival of the goods at the requested destination.
Should the court interpret UCC § 2-206(2) as applying to current shipments, the
court may exercise necessary control by factual determination of whether the offeror
was notified of this form of acceptance within a "reasonable" time.
Williams v. Emerson-Brantingham Implement Co., 198 S.W. 425, 427 (Mo. App.
1917) (dictum) :
We concede that where the offer is to have the other party do something for the
offered consideration, as distinguished from promising to do something, then
the doing of such thing by the other party is an acceptance and no notice by the
offeree of the intention to do the thing called for is necessary. An order to ship
goods becomes a contract when the goods are shipped, without any communica-
tion of the acceptance.
' UCC § 2-206(2); RESTATEMENT (SEcoID), CONTRACTS § 56(2).
UCC § 2-206(2) is applicable "When the beginning of a requested performance is
a reasonable mode of acceptance . ... " RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONTRACTS § 56(2)
applies only to offers which invite acceptance by performance and those where the
offeree has been empowered to choose between acceptance by performance and by
promise and chooses to accept by performance. The UCC allows the offeror to
consider his offer as having lapsed before acceptance if he is not notified of accep-
tance by beginning requested performance within a reasonable time. The Restate-
anent provision is limited to those circumstances where the offeree has reason to
know that the offeror has no adequate means of learning of the performance with
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notify the offeror promptly of the commencement of requested per-
formance is subject to liability for any damages resulting from his
failure.13' This position has the advantage of limiting the possibility
of speculation by the offeror.'32
The same position was also proposed in the 1958 "Rome" draft of
the Uniform International Act,133 but in the present formulation the
necessity of communicating notice of acceptance by act is not expressed
with the necessary clarity, and the sanction of damage liability for
failure to comply has been omitted.3 4 These omissions followed objec-
tions by various governments in their observations on the "Rome"
draft. 35 The purpose of requiring the offeree to exercise reasonable
reasonable promptness and certainty. Neither rule requires that the offeror receive
notice, but only that "such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in
ordinary course [be taken]," UCC § 1-201(26) ("notifies" defined), i.e., that the
offeree "exercises reasonable diligence"; RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS §
56(2) (a).
However, UCC § 2-206(2) provides that if the offeror is not notified of acceptance
within a reasonable time he may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance,
whereas RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 56(2) provides that the contractual
duty of the offer is discharged unless § 56(2) (a), (b), or (c) is satisfied.
See, e.g., ITALIAN CIVu.I CODE art. 1327, supra note 126.
"'There has been similar observation favoring the position proposed in the
"Rome" draft of the Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods. Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts:
77ree Attempts at Unification, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 305, 324-25 (1962): "The less
severe sanction of the Rome Draft seems adequate and, although it raises the problem
of proof of damages, it does not give the offeror the opportunity to speculate on a
change in the market or other conditions, as he may under the Code."
"m UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT art. 5, para. 2 (1958 draft) :
Acceptance may also consist of the delivery of a note or the payment of a price
according to the conditions of the offer, or of any act which may be considered
to be equivalent to an acceptance either by virtue of the offer or as a result of
earlier dealings between the parties. In such cases the acceptor without undue
delay should send to the offeror a notice informing him of the performance of the
act which amounts to acceptance; he must make good any damage caused by his
omission (to do this).
... UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL ACT art. 6 (1964 draft). See note 128 supra for text
of article 6.
Since article 6(1) requires that the declaration must be communicated, and in
article 6(2) the "other act must be considered to be equivalent to the declaration
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article," there is the possibility of effectively
contending that the act of acceptance other than dispatch of the goods must be com-
municated to the offeror. If this is intended it should be expressed specifically.
'Austrian Federal Government: "The obligation provided for at end of para. 2(Article 5 of the 'Rome' draft) according to which the acceptor should in the case
of a real acceptance (acceptance by act) in addition send information to the offeror
is not provided for in Austrian law. As this duty creates a burden on commercial
life and does not answer to any true legal economic need, its abrogation is to be
desired." Observations of the Governments and of the ICC oi the Draft Uniform
Law on the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Corporeal
Movables), The Hague, 1963, Doc./F/Prep./2, at 3 [hereinafter cited as 1963 Obser-
vations] in II Diplomatic Conference on the Unification of Law Governing the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods 436 (The Hague 1964) [hereinafter cited as II Diplomatic Con-
ference].
Great Britain: "The last sentence of paragraph 2 of Article 5 however, seems to
introduce an unfamiliar principle. If the offeror has waived the need for notification(and the preceding provision of the Article seem to contemplate that he may), it is
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effort to notify the offeror that he has commenced the requested per-
formance is to afford protection to both parties. The notification must
unambiguously express the offeree's intention to engage himself. 3 '
VI. VARIANCE OF OFFER AND ACCEPTANCE
A. Introduction
Japanese law does not expressly provide that the acceptance corres-
pond with the content of the offer, but the provision is implied. If the
offeree should indicate in responding to the offer that his acceptance is
subject to a condition, or if it includes any modification, he is deemed
to have rejected the original offer and to have made a counter-offer . 37
This position is well established in most advanced legal systems,
although it does not correspond with commercial practice. 3 ' The UCC,
in sections 2-206 and 2-207, attempts a closer correspondence.
This article will consider the effect of variances between requested
and tendered performance, as well as the legal consequences of vari-
ances in the communicated notice of acceptance. Attention will then
difficult to see why the acceptor should be liable in damages for failing to notify."
1963 Observations, at 17; II Diplomatic Conference 462.
For similar observations by the government of Denmark see 1963 Obscrvations,
at 13; Finland: 1963 Observations, at 39; Denmark, II Diplomatic Conference 444; Fin-
land, II Diplomatic Conference 446.
UCC § 2-206, comment 3, suggests that "Such a beghining of performnaiwe must
unambiguously express the offeree's intention to engage himself." (Emphasis added.)
It is not the beginning of performance that serves as the unambiguous expression of
the offeree's intention as the performance must have been requested. UCC § 2-206(2).
Rather it is the notification of acceptance by stating that the offeree has commenced
the requested performance that must be unambiguous.
In Excelsior Knitting Mills v. Bush, 38 Wn. 2d 876, 233 P.2d 847 (1951), a shirt
manufacturer delivered sample shirts to the respondent for his approval on September
13, 1949. Following correspondence the manufacturer wrote to respondent on Decem-
ber 10, 1949, informing him that the order for shirts had been placed in work and
requested a confirmation of the order. But the order was never confirmed and after
certain shirt styles had been manufactured and made ready for shipment the respon-
dent requested cancellation. The court held that a contract was never established.
"We think this is a case where both parties made tentative offers and both parties
acted without confirmation of the other party .... We think the trial court was
correct in finding that there was no contract as to the goods refused." Id. at 880,
233 P.2d at 849.
' JAPANESE CIVIL CODE art. 528.
In Tucker Duck & Rubber Co. v. Byram, 206 Ark. 828, 177 S.W.2d 759 (1944),
there xvas a purchase order for %" and 84" cuttings of lumber; the seller's acknowl-
edgment stated that he would "try to fill the order for 4" lumber" but he shipped only
the %". The acceptance was considered to be conditional and thus his failure to
deliver /4" cuttings did not constitute a breach of contract. See also Smith v. Oscar
H. Will & Co., 51 N.D. 357, 199 N.W. 861 (1924) (Turkestan alfalfa seed ordered,
seller shipped sweet clover seed); Hind v. Willich, 127 Misc. 355, 216 N.Y. Supp.
155 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 221 App. Div. 857, 224 N.Y. Supp. 819 (1926) (weigh deficiency in
bags of rice shipped by seller.)
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be given to the comparative approach with regard to these additional
or different terms in the exchanged communications.
B. Variance of Acceptance of Offer Requesting Prompt or
Current Shipment of Goods
Under the UCC, unless either the language of the offer or the circum-
stances unambiguously indicate otherwise, an order to buy goods for
prompt or current shipment is construed as inviting prompt or current
shipment as an alternate means of acceptance. 139 And the acceptance
does not depend on whether the shipped goods correspond to those
specified in the offer.
Upon tender and delivery, the buyer may reject all of the goods if
they do not conform, or accept some commercial units while rejecting
the balance. 140 Because of the unlikelihood of his discovering certain
non-conformity before acceptance, the buyer is given the right in lim-
ited situations to revoke the acceptance upon discovery. With revoca-
tion he obtains the same rights and duties with regard to the goods as
if he had rejected them.' 4 ' The buyer who has accepted the tender of
nonconforming goods preserves his damage remedy by notifying the
seller within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have dis-
covered the breach. 42
The drafters of the UCC sought to preclude the seller from effec-
tively claiming that his non-conforming shipment constituted a coun-
ter-offer, and that the buyer's receipt of tender without objection
constituted acceptance.'43 Therefore, the UCC imposes an obligation
of due notification upon the seller; if he does not want his shipment of
non-conforming goods to constitute an acceptance of the original
m See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
10 UCC § 2-601.
-" UCC §§ 2-608(1) (b), 2-608(3).
14
'UCC §2-607: "(3) Where a tender has been accepted (a) the buyer must
within a reasonable time after he discovers or should have discovered any breach
notify the seller of breach or be barred from any remedy; ..."
"' See Llewellyn, On our Case-Law of Ccmtracts, Offer and Acceptance II, 48
YALE L.J. 779, 812 (1939):
Suppose the shipment we have been discussing is not in accordance with the
order, though it has clear reference thereto. Orthodox analysis, lumping all
aspects of the shipment into one, has been led or driven to treating it as a counter-
offer. The approach here suggested can lead to treating it as an over expression
of active and effective agreement plus a defective attempted performance: an
acceptance plus a breach.
See also HAwYVLAND, U.C.C. SALES AND BuLK SAiEs 7 (1958); Project, A Com-
parison of California Sales Law and Article Two of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 10 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1087, 1118 (1963).
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offer, 44 the seller must seasonably notify the buyer that the shipment
is offered only as an accommodation. 45 This requirement is not
satisfied by the buyer's knowledge at the time of accepting delivery
that the goods do not correspond with the order.
C. Variance of Communicated Notice of Acceptance
Where an acceptance is by communication, rather than by action,
and includes additional or different terms from those in the offer, UCC
section 2-207 is applicable. In one of the first appellate level decisions
to consider the section,'46 the court, in an opinion that has already
resulted in extensive critical commentary, 47 disparaged the statute,
calling it "not too happily drafted."'4 The drafting is traceable to a
simple, commercially expedient proposal expressed in the mid-1940's
in the proposed Uniform Revised Sales Act.
Professor Llewellyn, the Reporter for the proposed legislation, was
concerned with two possible situations involving additional terms in an
acceptance or confirmation: (1) the wire or letter, intended as a
closing or a confirmation of an informal agreement, that includes
... The order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current shipment may
unambiguously indicate that the shipped goods must conform to the contract. UCC§ 2-206(1), introductory phrase. Under these circumstances the seller will be pre-
cluded from claiming in good faith that the non-conforming shipment and accom-
panying notice continued shipment solely for the buyer's accommodation.
. UCC § 2-206(1) (b). UCC § 1-204(3): "An action is taken 'seasonably' when
it is taken at or within the time agreed or if no time is agreed at or within a
reasonable time."
"'Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co, 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
' See Davenport, How to Handle Sales of Goods: The Problem of Conflicting
Purchase Orders and Acceptances and New Concepts in Contract Law, 19 Bus. LAw,
75 (1963); Hawkland, Major Changes Under the Uniform Commercial Code in the
Formation and Terms of Sales Contracts, Prac. Law., May 1964, p. 73; Hawkland,
The Buyer's Purchase Order Under the Uniform Commercial Code, Prac. Law.,
March 1965, p. 25; Phalan, Uniform Commercial Code-Sales-Inadvertent Acceptance
of Buyer's Terms, 62 DIcK. L. Rv. 170-73 (1958); Tandler, U.C.C. Sections 2-207:
Additional and Different Terms, Material Alteration of Contract, 88 N.J.LJ. 677(1965); Tisdale, Impact of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Law of Contracts,
39 N.D.L. REv. 7, 11-26 (1963); Wagner, How and By Whom May an Offer be
Accepted?, 11 VILL. L. REv. 95, 101-05 (1965).
Note, 3 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 573 (1962); Note, 42 B.U.L. REv. 373 (1962);
Note, Nonconforming Acceptances Under Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code: An end to the Battle of Forms, 30 U. CuI. L. RZv. 540 (1963) ; Note, Contract:
Sale of Goods: Acceptance of Offer: Additional or Different Terms: Section 2-270,
Uniform Commercial Code: Section 83(a) New York Personal Property Law, (New),
46 CORNELL L.Q. 308 (1961); Note, 1962 DuKn L.J. 613; Note, 76 HAIv. L. REv. 1481(1963) ; Note, 51 Ky. L.J. 563 (1963); Note, U.C.C. Section 2-270 and the "Counter
Offer": Acceptance Unlimited?, 57 Nw. U.L. REv. 477 (1962) ; Note, Contract Drafts-
manship Under Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 564,
567-72 (1964); Note, 111 U. PA. L. Rlv. 132 (1962); Note, Formation of a Contract-
Acceptance, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 839, 850-64 (1957). Cf. Sale of Goods: Offer and
Acceptance Containing Different Terms, 1960 NEw YoRK LAw REv. Comux'N REP. 103.
' Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497, 500 (1st Cir. 1962).
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minor additions; and (2) the exchange between merchants of printed
form contracts evidencing the intended consummation of an agreement,
but including different terms. 14 '9 To establish a legal rule correspond-
ing to the commercial practice in sales transactions, section 20 of the
Proposed Final Draft No. 1 for a Uniform Revised Sales Act stated
that additional terms in a definite expression of acceptance or in a
written confirmation shall be construed as proposals for modification,
and where both parties are merchants, the additions shall become part
of the contract, but only if essential terms are not altered and if
objection is not made within a reasonable time.1 0
An amended form of this proposal was brought into early drafts of
the UCC, and with each new draft it was further amended, each time in-
creasing in complexity. The 1950 UCC draft converted the conditional
statement of the Uniform Revised Sales Act into a positive statement
that definite and seasonable expression is an acceptance. 51 The 1952
draft made such acceptance effective even if it includes different terms
from those offered or agreed upon (the earlier draft had been limited
to additional terms).12 Then, owing to concern that too great a
burden was placed on the offeree, the 1956 draft permitted the offeree
to qualify his acceptance and expressly make it conditional upon offer-
"' UNIFO REVIsED SALES ACT § 20, comment at 128-29 (Proposed Final Draft
No. 1, 1944).
" UinORM REVISED SALES ACT (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944):
Section 20. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
Where either a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time states terms additional to
those offered or agreed upon (a) the additional terms are to be construed as
proposals for modification or addition; and (b) between merchants the addi-
tional terms become part of the contract if they do not alter the essential terms
and are not objected to within a reasonable time.
n UCC § 2-207 (Proposed Final Draft, 1950):
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to those offered or agreed upon.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract and between merchants become part of the contract unless they materially
alter it or notification of objection to them is given within a reasonable time
after they are received.
n2UCC § 2-207 (1952 draft).
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a reasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon.(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract and between merchants become part of the contract unless they materially
alter it or notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time.
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or's assent to any additional or different terms. 3 At the same time,
the offeror's power to control the terms of acceptance was given more
explicit recognition."5 4 In addition, cognizance was given to the fact
that the parties may recognize, by their conduct, the existence of a
contract in fact although a contract in law cannot be established solely
from their writings.'5 Undoubtedly section 2-207 will continue to
appear somewhat confusing and requires further elaboration here.
The most frequent pattern of litigation stemming from commercial
practice is that in which a purchase order for goods is submitted by
a buyer, frequently upon solicitation by the seller's agent, followed
by a written response from the seller containing terms additional
to or different from those in the offer. The litigating parties have been
reversed only rarely (with the legal action initiated by the seller as
offeror or by the buyer as offeree).'I In the past, whether the seller
was plaintiff'5 7 or defendant'" in litigation of this kind, he had a high
degree of success in the appellate courts.
I AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, 1956 RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD
FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-207 (1957) [hereinafter cited as 1956
RECOMMENDATIONS] :
Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirma-
tion which is sent within a seasonable time operates as an acceptance even
though it states terms additional to or different from those offered or agreed
upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional
or different terms.
(2) The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the
contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer;(b) they materially alter it, or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given or is given
within a reasonable time after notice of them is received.(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a contract is
sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the writings of the parties do
not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular contract
consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any
supplementary terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.
An earlier more extensive draft proposal in the 1956 Supplement No. 1 was re-
drafted following objection from the Pennsylvania Chamber of Commerce.
' See 1956 RECommmEwDAnioNs § 2-207(2) (a). UCC § 2-207(2) (1952 draft) added
the words "has already been given." See note 152 supra.
11956 RECOMMENDATIONS § 2-207(3).
"E.g., Dura Chem. Co. v. Dalton-Cooper, Inc., 107 N.YS.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1951)(plaintiff-buyer's efforts to accept offer were unsuccessful due to fact that his com-
munication contained material changes or modifications and was made after com-
munication to him of the revocation of seller's offer); Frick & Lindsay v. Johnston
& S. Ry. Co., 271 Pa. 546, 115 At. 837 (1922), (plaintiff-seller's offer was not accepted
due to material variance in terms of buyer's response as to time for shipment and
place for delivery); Annot., Difference Between Offer and Acceptance as Regards
Place of Payment or of Delivery as Variance Presenting Consummation of Con-
tract, 3 A.L.R.2d 256 (1949).
' See, e.g., American Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Co., 290
Fed. 632 (3rd Cir. 1923) ; Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., 102 Conn. 626, 129
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What effect does the enactment of UCC section 2-207 have upon
this established position? It should be emphasized that this section
is applicable in two situations: (1) where there has been a definite
and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written confirmation
sent within a reasonable time, and (2) where the conduct of both
parties recognizes the existence of a contract, although the contract
cannot otherwise be established by means of the parties' writings.
In the former situation, this section is only applicable where there is
a definite expression of acceptance, and presumably the written con-
firmation must be equally definite.'" 9 Thus, situations still exist in
which the court must analyze the problem in terms of whether the
At. 782 (1925); Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Singer Lumber Co., 168 So. 368
(La. App.), rehearing denied, 169 So. 100 (La. App. 1936); Tilt v. La Salle Silk
Mfg. Co., 5 Daly (N.Y.) 19 (1873); Vaughan's Seed Store, Inc. v. Morris April &
Bros., 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Nelson Equip. Co. v. Hanper, 191
Ore. 359, 230 P.2d 188 (1951) (asphalt paver); Calcasieu Paper Co. v. Memphis
Paper Co., 32 Tenn. App. 293, 222 S.W2d 617 (1949). But see A.E. Staley Mfg.
Co. v. Northern Co-ops., 168 F.2d 892 (8th Cir. 1948) (seller's change in date of
shipment constituted a counter-offer precluding his subsequent effective acceptance
of the original offer). In Banks v. Crescent Lumber & Shingle Co., 61 Wn. 2d 528,
379 P.2d 203 (1963), the seller, in "accepting" broker's order, changed the terms of
payment; the defendant-broker was obligated to pay the additional amount based upon
the changed term as to the lumber shipped and accepted, but not as to the balance of
the orders that were cancelled by the broker.
" See, e.g., Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962)
(buyer precluded from effectively claiming breach of sales warranty due to dis-
claimer of warranty term included in seller's acceptance form (UCC § 2-207 ap-
plied)); Sadler Mach. Co. v. Ohio Nat'l, Inc., 202 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1953)
(buyer unsuccessful in efforts to regain down payment on destroyed machinery;
court found that seller's change in terms of payment was "merely a correction of the
buyer's error."); Cohen v. Cerame, 275 App. Div. 904, 89 N.YS.2d 635, 636 (1949)
(buyer successfully claimed that seller's failure to deliver "free cutting brass rods"
constituted breach of contract; court found that both parties understood that seller's
acceptance was conditioned upon ability to obtain goods from the government);
Gunderson v. Kenyon, 253 App. Div. 306, 2 N.Y.S2d 1 (1938) (buyer's claim that
seller breached contract for shipment of twine held unsuccessful as time was under-
stood to be of the essence and the seller's response "to be shipped at the mills' con-
venience" constituted a counter offer that was never accepted); Schorsch v. Hartford
City Paper Co., 165 N.Y. Supp. 261 (Sup. Ct. 1917) (buyer unsuccessfully claimed
that seller's failure to make shipments constituted breach; seller's acknowledgment
specified shipment f.o.b. mills Indiana, whereas buyer's order called for delivery f.o.b.
New York).
But cf. Estes Lumber Co. v. Palmyra Yellow Pine Co., 29 Ga. App. 15, 113 S.E.
821 (1922) (syllabus only) (although seller's "acceptance" added new terms, the
plaintiff-buyer continued to demand shipment after receipt of this communication).
' In Tilt v. La Salle Silk Mfg. Co., 5 Daly (N.Y.) 19 (1873), the plaintiff-seller
responded in writing to the buyer's order: "We approve of the foregoing contract,
with the understanding that we are not to be held responsible for any delay beyond
our control...." The buyer accepted the first late delivery and was precluded from
rejecting subsequent late shipments. Cf. Banks v. Crescent Lumber & Shingle Co.,
61 Wn. 2d 528, 379 P.2d 203 (1963), where the seller marked a copy of the purchaser's
order form "accepted," changed the terms of payment to "Full payment 21 days" and
returned it to the buyer. Buyer was permitted to effectively cancel the undelivered
orders following a drop in market price of the lumber.
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offeror has accepted a counter-offer. ° This is especially true of trans-
actions that never proceed beyond the executory level. 6 '
If there has been a definite and seasonable expression of acceptance
or a written confirmation sent within a reasonable time, the UCC
provides that it operates as an acceptance even though it states terms
additional to or different from those offered or agreed upon, unless the
acceptance is expressly made conditional upon offeror's assent to the
additional or different terms. 02 Such a definite expression of accep-
tance that is expressly conditional on offeror's assent to additional or
different terms is in fact a conditional acceptance, with the offeree
proposing a counter-offer. Whether the offeree states that he definitely
accepts, subject to the condition that additional or different terms are
assented to by the offeror, or that he definitely will not accept the offer
except upon the offeror's assenting to the additional or different terms,
his expression carries the same meaning.
The printed acceptance form often used by the offeree (seller)
frequently contains terms that do not correspond with those on the
purchaser's printed order forms; it may even contain terms that are
in direct conflict with the order form. If the offeree (seller) does not
want his expression to operate as an acceptance, he must be sure that
either the form cannot be legally construed as a definite expression of
' See Machine Tool & Equip. Corp. v. R.F.C., 131 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1942)
(acceptance conditioned on rebuilding railroad); Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods
Co. v. Reynolds, 64 Fed. 560 (E.D. Mo. 1894) (shipment proposed on board cars at
Little Falls, New Jersey, rather than requested delivery in New York); Gettier-
Montanye, Inc. v. Davidson Granite Co., 75 Ga. App. 377, 43 S.E.2d 716 (1947);
Champlin v. Jackson, 317 Mass. 461, 58 N.E.2d 757 (1945) (price to be determined
by surface measure rather than requested board measure) ; Fox v. Cavalcade Fabrics,
Inc., 280 App. Div. 769, 113 N.Y.S.2d 474 (Sup. Ct. 1952), affirming 115 N.Y.S.2d
65 (New York City Ct. 1950); Cohen v. Cerame, 275 App. Div. 904, 89 N.Y.S.2d
635, 636 (1949) (seller's acceptance conditioned on receipt of the requested brass
rod from the War Assets Administration); Russell v. Falls Mfg. Co., 106 Wis. 329,
82 N.W. 134 (1900) (flour).
For cases in which buyer's communication did not constitute a definite expression
of acceptance see, e.g., In re Marcalus Mfg. Co., 120 F. Supp. 784, 786 (D.N.J. 1954)
("The new purchase order contained material conditions, including a modification of
the terms of payment, which were not embodied in the debtor's counter-offer.");
Dura Chem. Co. v. Dalton-Cooper, Inc., 107 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. 1951) (buyer's
attempted acceptance contained "certain material changes or modifications" which
were never adopted).
..See Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co. v. Reynolds, 64 Fed. 560 (E.D.
fo. 1894); Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., 102 Conn. 626, 139 Atl. 782
(1925); Estes Lumber Co. v. Palmyra Yellow Pine Co., 29 Ga. App. 15, 113 S.E.
821 (1922); Whiteford v. Hitchcock, 74 Mich. 208, 41 N.W. 898 (1889); Cohen v.
Cerame, 275 App. Div. 904, 89 N.Y.S.2d 635 (1949); Gunderson v. Kenyon, 253
App. Div. 306, 2 N.YS.2d 1 (1938); Schorsch v. Hartford City Paper Co., 165
N. Y. Supp. 261 (Sup. Ct. 1917); Frick & Lindsay v. Johnstown & S. Ry., 271 Pa.
536, 115 Atl. 837 (1922); Banks v. Crescent Lumber & Shingle Co., 61 Wn. 2d 528,
379 P.2d 203 (1963) (part of orders cancelled).
UCC § 2-207 (1).
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acceptance, or that it is clearly stated in the form that the acceptance
is conditional upon offeror's assent to the additional or different terms.
These qualifications to legal acceptance, as well as the notification
required by UCC section 2-206 that shipment is offered only as an
accommodation to the buyer, are included for the seller's protection.
However, reported litigation indicates that the offeree (seller) is rarely
in need of such protection.'63 The legal effect of such an acceptance
upon the offeror (buyer) is more important. Indeed, the buyer receiv-
ing a responsive communication stating that his order has been ac-
cepted, but with different terms for payment, cannot safely disregard
the communication and purchase the goods elsewhere." 4
Since the offeree (seller) may condition the legal operation of his
acceptance on assent by the offeror (buyer) to the additional or differ-
ent terms, the manner of effective assent to immaterial additions in
the mercantile transaction must be resolved. The offeror's silence
following communication of the qualified acceptance may, on occasion,
constitute such assent.16 5 Although the UCC does not so state,'66 the
same position should be adopted as to minor differences in the accept-
ance, especially where the litigable dispute arises out of an on-going
transaction.
"Estes Lumber Co. v. Palmyra Yellow Pine Co., 29 Ga. App. 15, 113 S.E. 821(1922) (syllabus only), is one of the few reported decisions in which the seller added
additional terms to his acceptance and then was held in breach of contract due to his
failure to make delivery.
For the legal effect of such an acceptance upon the offeror (buyer), see Washing-
ton Elec. Co-op v. Norry Elec. Corp., 193 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir. 1951) ("The
appellant first contends that no contract ever came into existence because there was
no unequivocal acceptance of the buyer's offer to purchase. This is apparently an
after-thought."); Tilt v. La Salle Silk Mfg. Co., 5 Daly (N.Y.) 19 (1873) (buyer-
offeror, having accepted partial delivery could not reject the balance where shipment
was made under express qualification against liability for possible delay); Sadler
Mach. Co. v. Ohio Nat'l, Inc., 202 F.2d 887, 891 (6th Cir. 1953) (buyer unsuccessful
in effort to regain his down payment on machinery destroyed in fire at seller's
plant; court found that the variances in the seller's acceptance were merely corrections
of the buyer's errors).
1" 1955 N.Y.L. REv. Com!mi'N REPORT 635 (Illustration suggested by Professor
Patterson). UCC § 2-207 was subsequently amended but the problem remains in the
present (1962) formulation. The terms of payment, in the proposed hypothetical
constitute a different rather than an additional term, thus UCC § 2-207(2) is inappli-
cable, and since both parties have not recognized the existence of a contract, UCC§ 2-207(3) does not apply.
UCC §2-207(2). Betxveen merchants the additional terms become part of the
contract unless they materially alter it, or express objection is made or the offer
limits acceptance to the terms of the offer.1 UCC § 2-207(2) refers to the construction of only additional terms. Comment
3 to UCC § 2-207 suggests: "Whether or not additional or different terms will
become part of the agreement depends upon the provisions of subsection (2). If
they are such as materially to alter the original bargain, they will not be included
unless expressly agreed to by the other party." (Emphasis added.) For criticism




It is, however, the manner of assent to material additions or differen-
ces that is likely to provoke controversy, and there is no effort toward
resolution made in the UCC. The court is permitted considerable free-
dom in shaping its own solution. There has been a tendency of the
judiciary to find that the buyer implicitly assents to the variance of
terms in the seller's written acceptance when he fails to make objection
following receipt of the tendered goods.11 7 A limited sampling of
business opinion indicates that offerors are often willing to be bound
by statements in their suppliers' acknowledgment forms. 16
To resolve this question under the UCC provision, it must be deter-
mined if the offeree's expression of acceptance or written confirmation
is definite and seasonable, and if the writings of the parties establish
a contract between them.169 Even if there is failure to prove either
requirement, an enforceable contract may still be established where
both parties by their conduct (which may include shipment of the
ordered goods and acceptance without objection) recognize its exis-
tence. But under these circumstances the conflicting terms in the
offeree's (seller's) acceptance are legally ineffective,'17 a position that
may be disadvantageous to him.
Additional terms that are included in an effective acceptance are
" See Washington Elec. Co-Op v. Norry Elec. Corp., 193 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.
1951); American Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Co., 290 Fed. 632
(3rd Cir. 1923); Everett v. Emmons Coal Mining Co., 289 Fed. 686 (6th Cir. 1923);
Caskey v. Williams Bros., 227 Ky. 73, 11 S.W.2d 991 (1928) (race horse); Applica-
tion of Doughboy Indus. Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.YS.2d 488 (1962) ; White-
man Food Prods. Co. v. Prodotti Alimentairi, 31 N.J. Super. 277, 106 A.2d 321(App. Div. 1954) (proceedings for writ of attachment); Producers Grain Corp. v.
Rust, 291 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Caldwell Bros. & Co. V. Coast
Coal Co., 58 Wash. 461, 108 Pac. 1075 (1910) (dictum) (partial acceptance of manu-
factured coal bunker and washer).
Buyer breached contract in refusing to accept tendered delivery: Riverside Coal
Co. v. Elman Coal Co., 114 Conn. 492, 159 Atl. 280 (1932); Boston Lumber Co. v.
Pendleton Bros., 102 Conn. 626, 129 Atl. 782 (1925).
See also Annot, Circumstances supporting inference of original offeror's accept-
ance of counter offer or assent to conditions attached by offeree to his acceptance,
135 A.L.R. 821 (1941).
" Sampling made by questionnaire submitted to businessmen by the Unihersity
of Pennsylvania Law Review in 1957, in Note, Formation of a Contract-Acceptance,
105 U. PA. L. Rrv. 839, 858 (1957):
In response to a questionnaire, answering businesses indicated almost uni-
formly their willingness to be bound by statements in their suppliers' acknowl-
edgement forms. This practice itself affords basis for denying offerees the
right to demand specific assent as a condition of a binding contract. Business-
men should not be enabled to escape in court, commitments which they would
have observed as a matter of course but for the litigation.
' UCC §§ 2-207(1), 2-207(3). UCC § 2-204(3): "Even though one or more
terms are left open a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties
have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for giving
an appropriate remedy."
170 UCC § 2-207(3).
I VOL. 42: 347
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
construed as proposals for additions to the contract, but the language
of the UCC, in contrast with the suggested interpretation in the
Official Comment, does not direct a similar construction for different
terms included in the legally effective expression of acceptance." The
courts are forced to distinguish factually between the two categories
of variance from the offer, a task that is not only difficult, but rarely
of value. Since the variance cannot materially alter the contract,172
and since both parties must be merchants, terms that are either addi-
tional or different should be treated alike. Thus, where the date of
delivery is not of primary significance to either party, an acceptance
that specifies delivery a few days earlier than requested in the order
should be construed as a modification of the offer, unless the offeror
voices express objection within a reasonable time.' 3 Indeed North
Carolina and Wisconsin, in adopting the UCC, have included the words
"or different" in section 2-207(2).
The offeror can control the legally operative terms of acceptance
by stating in the offer that the acceptance is limited to the terms of the
offerY.4 The obvious advantage that this affords him will undoubtedly
result in the inclusion of a similar phrase as standard practice in
printed commercial forms offering the purchase or sale of goods.
"
1tJCC § 2-207(2) : "The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract." Comment 3 to UCC § 2-207, see supra note 166.
..In Poel v. Brunswick-Balke-Collender Co., 216 N.Y. 310, 110 N.E. 619 (1915),
an order for rubber was telephoned on April 2 for import to New York This was
followed by a brief "acceptance" on April 4 enclosing a more formal writing con-
taining minor additional terms. The buyer responded on April 6 on an "order"
form in which the seller was to "guaranty" the deliveries as agreed upon and
"which in any event you must promptly acknowledge." The court found the response
of April 6 to be a conditional acceptance which in turn was never accepted. How-
ever, the contract was established by the response on April 4 to the telephoned order,
and the question should have been one of the correct disposition of the additional
terms. See Llewellyn's Comment to UmioRm REVISED SAIEs ACT § 20 at 129 (Pro-
posed Final Draft No. 1, 1944). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), CONTRACTS § 60,
illustration 1 (formerly illustration 1 to § 60 of the original Restatement) and the sug-
gestion in the Reporter's Note that the illustration was modified in the light of
UCC § 2-207.
" See Nelson Equip. Co. v. Harner, 191 Ore. 359, 230 P.2d 188, 193 (1951):
We do not consider an expression of willingness to deliver goods a few days
before the date specified to be indicative of a counter offer. In fact, the de-
fendant testified that he had "requested a little earlier delivery." If he had not
wanted the earlier delivery he could have refused to accept the machine until 1
April. The defendant's contention in this respect is without merit.
See also Washington Elec. Co-Op v. Norry Elec. Corp., 193 F.2d 412, 414 (2d Cir.
1951) (neither the expression in the acceptance as to time of payment nor the type of
carrier to be used constituted a material variance from the terms of the buyer's
offer).74 UCC § 2-207(2) (a). Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d
216, 233 N.YS.2d 48 490 (1962): "The buyer's form contained a provision that
only a signed consent would bind the buyer to any terms thereafter transmitted in
any commercial form of the seller.'
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Today, many sales organizations, as members of trade associations,
include in their printed forms the requirement that the buyer must
express an objection to the terms of the submitted order within a
limited number of days from its date.' 5
Commercial transactions for the purchase of goods are often formu-
lated by the exchange of printed forms, each containing provisions that
are advantageous to the sender and therefore different from each
other . 6  The offeree's (seller's) printed acceptance may include a
definite expression of acceptance conditioned on the buyer's assent to
any terms that add to or differ from the offer. Thus, the exchanged
forms may both limit the terms of the acceptance to those of the offer,
and limit the effectiveness of the acceptance to assent to terms that
are not in the offer. On the basis of the exchanged writings alone, the
parties have failed to establish a legally enforceable contract. But the
drafters of the UCC recognized that commercial sales transactions
frequently go forward with little concern for legal formalism. The
conduct of the parties may evidence an existing contract, regardless
of discrepancies in their exchanged printed formsY.77  The contract
'For litigation involving such clauses see Albrecht Chem. Co. Inc. v. Anderson
Trading Corp., 298 N.Y. 437, 84 N.E.2d 625 (1949) (arbitration provision); Ap-
plication of Doughboy Indus., Inc., supra note 174 (arbitration provision).
The following trade associations representing sellers include a similar provision
in their recommended forms: Affiliated Dress Manufacturers, Inc.; Associated Corset
and Brassiere Manufacturers, Inc.; Associated Fur Manufacturers, Inc.; Trouser Insti-
tute of America; Boys' Apparel and Accessories Manufacturers Association; Chicago
Fashions Industries; Fashion Originators Guild of America, Inc.; Industrial Council
of Cloak, Suit & Shirt Manufacturers, Inc.; Infants' and Children's Coat Association,
Inc.; International Association of Garment Manufacturers; Merchants' Ladies Garment
Association, Inc.; Millinery Stabilization Commission; National Association of Blouse
Manufacturers, Inc.; National Authority for the Ladies' Handbag Industry; National
Coat and Suit Industry Recovery Board; National Dress Manufacturers' Association;
National Heavy Outwear Association; National Knitted Outwear Association;
National Skirt and Sportswear Manufacturers Association, Inc.; New England Shoe
and Leather Association; Popular Priced Dress Manufacturers' Group, Inc.; United
Infants' and Children's Wear Association, Inc.
A similar protective clause for purchasers is included in the Basic Trade Pro-
visions of the National Retail Dry Goods Ass'n. See 1954 N.Y.L. REv. Comra'N
REPORT 121.
'Examples of exchange of form contracts for the sale of goods: Roto-Lith, Ltd.
v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962) (applying UCC § 2-207);
American Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Mill & Lumber Co., 290 Fed. 632 (3d Cir.
1923); Albrecht Chem. Co. Inc. v. Anderson Trading Corp., 298 N.Y. 437, 84 N.E.2d
625 (1949).
esi of L. H. Huribert, Attorney at Law, Buffalo, New York before the
New York Law Revision Commision at Buffalo, New York, on May 3, 1954, in
1954 N.Y.L. Rv. Comaie REPORT 1241:
You have to understand that these things come out in regular routine. A com-
pany will be issuing scores or hundreds of purchase orders each day. When the
acceptances come back, they are matched up by some clerk. Somebody may look
at them; most of the time nobody does and generally there is no trouble. Things
go through. Well trouble comes, either in periods of stress in our economy,
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thus established by the conduct of the parties, is given legal recognition
limited to those terms on which the differing writings agree, supple-
mented by terms that may be incorporated from other provisions of the
UCC Sales article.17 8
The contract created in this manner cannot be effectively challenged
on the ground of indefiniteness, for terms may be left open when the
parties intend to make a contract and when there is a reasonably
certain basis for giving an appropriate remedy." A similar effort to
give legal effect to the recognized intent of the parties is found in
article 155 of the German Civil Code. If both parties consider that they
have concluded a contract, although in fact they have not come to an
agreement on some individual points, their contract may still be legally
valid where it can be established that they would have been willing to
conclude an agreement without reference to the matters left open.'
French jurisprudence, recognizes a tacit acceptance inferred from the
act of sending ordered goods.' 81
The offeree (seller) who ships goods at about the same time as
delivery is made of his non-conforming written acceptance may be
more concerned with salvaging an enforceable contract than he is with
insisting on particular terms in his acceptance. 2 However, the dispute
may not center on the validity of the executed contract, but on the
application of a particular disputed term, such as the disclaimer of
sales warranty,8 3 or on the submission of disputes to arbitration. 84
In fact, the disputed term may be important to both parties, and either
one way or the other, or when there is a failure of proper articles being furnished
in accordance with delivery. They get you into a jam, where you can argue for
the next three years.
See Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233 N.YS.2d 488,
492 (1962): "Recognizing, as one should, that the businessmen in this case acted
with complete disdain for the 'lawyer's consent' of the very commercial forms they
were sending and receiving, the question is what obligation ought the law to attach
to the arbitration clause."
"UCC § 2-207(3). Thus the goods that have been tendered and accepted may not
be subject to express warranty because the written offer and acceptance are in
conflict as to its application, but the implied sales warranties, UCC §§ 2-313, 2-314,
2-315, are applicable.
7 UCC § 2-204(3).
11 GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 155 (1950). Cohn, Civil Law, in 1 GREAT BRITAIN
FOREIGN OFFICE MANUAL OF GEmErT LAW 50 (1950).
Amos & WALTON, INTRODUcTION To FRENCH LAW 156 (2d ed. 1963).
See Note, 76 HARv. L. REV. 1481, 1483 (1963).
' See Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962)
(applying UCC § 2-207); Vaughan's Seed Store v. Morris April & Bros., 123 N.J.L.
26, 7 A.2d 868 (Sup. Ct 1939).
' See Albrecht Chem. Co. Inc. v. Anderson Trading Corp., 298 N.Y. 437, 84
N.E.2d 625 (1949); Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 216, 233
N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962).
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of them may prefer the other's choice of term to the complete elimina-
tion of the term from the enforceable contract. s5
VII. COMPARATIVE INTERPRETATION OF ADDITIONAL OR
DIFFERENT TERMS IN COMMUNICATED ACCEPTANCE
In Roto-Lith, Ltd.,1 86 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
interpreting UCC section 2-207, observed: "It would be unrealistic to
suppose that when an offeree replies, setting out conditions that would
be burdensome only to the offeror, he intended to make an uncondi-
tional acceptance of the original offer, leaving it simply to the offeror's
good nature whether he would assume the additional restrictions." ' 7
But the language of the UCC forces the offeree to express just such an
intent in his acceptance. If his communication contains a definite and
seasonable expression of acceptance, he must qualify it by expressly
requiring the offeror's (buyer's) assent to additional or different terms
contained therein. Otherwise, the offeree's expression operates as a
legally binding acceptance into which only the additional terms that do
not materially alter the contract are incorporated as part of the con-
tract."" And even these minor additions may be precluded by the
" The buyer's purchase order may call for extension of credit for a stated period,
or for the quality of the ordered goods to meet certain specifications. The seller's
acknowledgment may reduce the term of credit to be extended, or propose a lower
standard of quality. But neither seller nor buyer contemplate a cash transaction, nor
that the quality of the goods to be delivered remain unspecified beyond the implied
requirement of merchantability. For the legal system to strike the credit or quality
term under UCC § 2-207(3) forces a contract upon the parties that neither may
desire.
' Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
7Id. at 500.
' UCC § 2-206 (2) (b). Examples of variances in the seller's acceptance that
were found not to be material: Franklin Research & Dev. Corp. v. Swift Elec.
Supply Co., 340 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 1964) : "The offer and acceptance are not re-
quired to meet with geometric precision in order to form a valid contract. In the
present case, the parties consistently acted as if they had made a binding agreement,
and Franklin should not be penalized for the failure of the parties to draft their
communications with the niceties of contract law foremost in their minds." Wash-
ington Elec. Co-Op v. Norry Elec. Corp., 193 F2d 412 (2d Cir. 1951) (manner and
time of shipment); Riverside Coal Co. v. Elman Coal Co., 114 Conn. 492, 159 Atl.
280 (1932); Boston Lumber Co. v. Pendleton Bros., 102 Conn. 626, 129 Atl. 782
(1925) (term excusing seller in the event of delayed or prevented delivery) ; Tilt v.
La Salle Silk Mfg. Co., 5 Daly (N.Y.) 19 (1873) (term excusing delayed delivery);
Calcasieu Paper Co. v. Memphis Paper Co., 32 Tenn. App. 293, 222 S.W.2d 617
(1949) (shipment subject to completion of prior orders). See also suggested illustra-
tions in UCC § 2-207, comment 5.
Examples of clauses that materially alter the contract: Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F. P.
Bartlett & Co., 297 F2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962) (disclaimer of warranties-similar
suggestion UCC § 2-207, comment 4); Vaughan's Seed Store v. Morris April &
Bros., 123 N.J.L. 26, 7 A.2d 868 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (disclaimer of warranties and
limitation of time to express dissatisfaction with goods [Today under applicable
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expressed terms of the offer or by the offeror's giving notification of
objection within a reasonable time.'89 A similar position is expressed
in article 154 of the German Civil Code,190 and is also well established
in French jurisprudence.' 9' Although failing to establish a binding
contract based solely upon exchanged writings, the parties may still
salvage the contract, to the extent that the terms agree, based upon the
conduct of the parties that recognizes its existence.
The UCC does give legal recognition to the fact that the sales
manager and the purchasing agent are rarely concerned with the minor
deviations that occur with the exchange of different printed forms. 92
In many large scale operations, even if there were greater concern, it
UCC provision the latter term might be found to be unconscionable, UCC § 2-302;
or that the merchant-seller was not in good faith, TJCC § 2-103(1) (b), in that seller
refused to honor an objection received on the sixth day after delivery of goods under
an acceptance requiring objection within five days.]); Albrecht Chem. Co. Inc. v.
Anderson Trading Corp., 298 N.Y. 437, 84 N.E.2d 625 (1949) (term requiring
arbitration of disputes); Application of Doughboy Indus., Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d
216, 233 N.Y.S.2d 488 (1962) (term requiring arbitration of disputes); Banks v.
Crescent Lumber & Shingle Co., 61 Wn. 2d 528, 379 P.2d 203 (1963) (term re-
quiring "full payment 21 days").
For additional examples of suggested typical clauses which would normally materi-
ally alter the contract see UCC § 2-207, comment 4.
' 'UCC §§2-207(2) (a), 2-207(2) (c).
Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 60. Purported Acceptance Which Adds
Qualifications.
"A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the offeror's
assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but
is a counter-offer."
I GE~Ax CIVIL CODE (BGB) art. 154 (1950). Cohn, Civil Law, in 1 GREAT
BRITAIN FOREIGN OFmc MANA. OF GExRAN LAW 50 (1950): "An agreement is
concluded only, if both parties have agreed on every point on which according to the
declaration of even one of them agreement is required, section 154 BGB'
"'lAmos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION To FRENcH LAw, 156 (2d ed. 1963): "The
acceptance must meet the offer: if it is qualified by reservation or new conditions
it is tantamount to a new offer which, in turn, must be accepted if a contract is to
emerge."
"'This fact is illustrated in Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations In Business:
A Prelminary Studiy, 28 Am. Soc. REv. 55, 59 (1963) :
Ten of the 12 purchasing agents interviewed said that frequently the pro-
visions on the back of their purchase order and those on the back of a supplier's
acknowledgment would differ or be inconsistent. Yet they would assume that the
purchase was complete without further action unless one of the supplier's pro-
visions was really objectionable. Moreover, only occasionally would they bother
to read the fine print on the back of suppliers' forms.
Sixteen sales managers were asked about the battle of forms. Nine said that
frequently no agreement was reached on which set of fine print was to govern,
while seven said that there was no problem. Four of the seven worked for
companies whose major customers are the large automobile companies or the
large manufacturers of paper products. These customers demand that their
terms and conditions govern any purchase, are careful generally to see that sup-
pliers acquiesce, and have the bargaining power to have their way. The other
three of the sales managers who have no battle of the forms problem, work for
manufacturers of special industrial machines. Their firms are careful to reach
complete agreements with their customers.
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would be too difficult and uneconomical to compare all of the fine print
for variations.'93
In Japanese legal theory, the offeree who attaches conditions to his
acceptance is deemed to have rejected the offer and extended his own
proposal for possible acceptance. From the viewpoint of interpreta-
tion, however, the Japanese position is similar to that in UCC section
2-207, and the judicial attitude toward an offeree's reply that materi-
ally alters the offer is important.
Article 7 of the Uniform International Act clearly reflects the
influence of the United States' delegation to the diplomatic conference
on the Unification of Law Governing the International Sale of Goods
held at The Hague in April 1964.111 Although the basic positions
adopted by both the Uniform International Act and the UCC are
similar, there are differences in expression and approach that warrant
comparison. The Uniform International Act explicitly states its basic
position: that an acceptance containing additions, limitations or other
modifications is normally both a rejection of the offer and a counter-
offer. On the other hand, the UCC leaves this basic proposition for
implication.'95 The language of the Uniform International Act in the
area under present consideration is markedly superior to that of the
UCC, with the latter reflecting its piece-meal drafting revisions.'
These segments of legislation are concerned with the same problems:
(1) The determination of when a reply containing variances consti-
'S Macaulay, supra note 192, at 59:
The seller's acknowledgment form may be received by the buyer and checked by
a clerk. She will read the face of the acknowledgment but not the fine print on
the back of it because she has neither the time nor ability to analyze the small
print on the 100 to 500 forms she must review each day. The face of the
acknowledgment-where the goods and the price are specified-is likely to
correspond with the face of the purchase order. If it does, the two forms are
filed away. At this point, both buyer and seller are likely to assume they have
planned an exchange and made a contract.
" The earlier drafts of the proposed Uniform International Act did not include
a provision concerning the legal effect of the acceptance containing additional or
different terms from those in the offer. See UNIrFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT (1958
draft). For English translation of the proposed 1936 draft, see Preliminary Draft
of a Uniform Law on International Contracts Made by Correspondence. I UNIFICATION
OF LAw 161 (1948). It was not until the 1964 Conference that the United States, in
its newly acquired position as member delegate to the international organizations,
actively participated in the drawing conferences. See Honnold, The Uniform Lawfor the International Sale of Goods; The Hague Conference of 1964, 30 LAw &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 326, 329 (1965) (discussion of the working conferences on the
revised draft for a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods).
UNIFORMX INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 7, para. 2, is stated as a special exception to
the basic rule, but UCC § 2-207 is expressed without qualification.
"Compare UCC §2-207(1): "(1) A definite and seasonable expression of ac-
ceptance or a written confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates
as an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or different from those
offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to
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tutes a legally operative acceptance; and (2) the extent to which any
terms of variance are to be included as part of such acceptance. On the
former question, the Uniform International Act is the more limited,
since it applies only to additional or different terms that do not materi-
ally alter the offer. Section 2-207(1) of the UCC does not include this
restriction, but of course the more material the variance in the offeree's
reply, the less likely that it constitutes the required "definite" expres-
sion of acceptance or written confirmation.
As for the terms to be included in the operative acceptance, there
are again important differences between the two legislative expressions.
Although the Official Comment to UCC section 2-207 suggests that
the contract may include different as well as additional terms that do
not materially alter it, the language of the section, perhaps through
inadvertance, is limited to the immaterial additional term. This is an
unnecessary discrimination that is not found in the Uniform Inter-
national Act. In addition, the latter correctly refers to altering the
terms of the offer; the former refers to altering the terms of the
contract.197 Although in theory the Uniform International Act is more
limited regarding the scope of the enforceable variances in the reply,
the UCC adopts a more restrictive attitude regarding additional terms
incorporated into the acceptance. Under the UCC the transaction must
be "between merchants," and is subject to exclusion where the offer
expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer; neither restriction
is expressed specifically in the Uniform International Act.198 Although
both sets of legislation recognize the offeror's legal right, by timely
objection, to preclude the automatic incorporation of even immaterial
additional terms, the Uniform International Act expresses the matter
with greater clarity.199
the additional or different terms," with UNIFORM' INTRMNATioNAL AcT art. 7, para.
2 (1964 draft) : "(2) However a reply to an offer which purports to be an accep-
tance but which contains additional or different terms which do not materially alter
the terms of the offer shall constitute an acceptance unless the offeror promptly ob-jects to the discrepancy; if he does not so object, the terms of the contract shall be
the terms of the offer with the modifications contained in the acceptance."
17UCC § 2-207(2): "The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for
addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part of the contract
unless: ... (b) they materially alter it." (Emphasis added.) "It" refers to "the
contract," whereas UNnoRM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 7(2) (1964 draft) refers to "the
terms of the offer." See note 196 supra.
2's Compare UCC § 2-207 (2) (a), with UNIFORMI INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 7, para.
2 (1964 draft). See note 196 supra.WCf. UCC §2-207(2)(c), and UNIoRM INTRNATi OAL AcT art. 7, para. 2(1964 draft). See note 196 supra.
UCC §2-207(3) gives legal recognition to the contract in fact created by the
conduct of both parties, despite the lack of legally enforceable written contract.
Although the factual distinction necessary for application of UCC § 2-207(3) rather
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VIII. TimE OF EFFECTIVE ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER..
A. The Common Law
The time allotted by the judicial system for revocation of the offer
made inter absentes, and the time when the acceptance of the offer is
effective to establish a binding contract, are interrelated. Obviously,
the longer the period in which the offer may be revoked, the greater
the risk that the offeree's reliance interest may be disappointed. Thus,
the judicial attitude toward the effective date of an acceptance by
correspondence is influenced by the position which the particular legal
system adopts towards the binding nature of the offer. This is seen
in a comparison of the common law and the civil law systems.00
It had been basic to the common law system that the bare offer, not
supported by the formality of seal or of consideration, was subject to
revocation by communication until the time of its effective acceptance.
To afford the offeror this extent of freedom of revocation, and to
require that the offeree's communication of acceptance when made at a
distance must be received to be effective, placed the parties in im-
balance.
By the beginning of the last century, the Anglo-American legal
system diminished this imbalance by reducing the application of the
subjective standard of a required meeting of the minds, and by estab-
lishing the time of the acceptance of the offer as the time of the dis-
patch of the communication (dispatch rule). Thus, by the time of the
than UCC § 2-207(1) (definite and seasonable expression of acceptance) may be
difficult, it is of advantage to include an expression similar to UCC § 2-207(3).
Unfortunately the Uxn'oRm INTERNATIONAL AcT (1964 draft) does not do so.
'MacNeil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112
U. PA. L. REV. 947, 952-53 (1964) :
Some legal systems protect these interests of the offeree before he dispatches the
acceptance. For example, German law generally makes offers irrevocable. Other
civil law systems protect at least the reliance interest by the doctrine of culpa-
in-contrahendo. Except for limited and recent American developments in the
doctrine of promissory estoppel and a handful of statutory provisions of limited
application, the inexorable logic of the consideration dogma has prevented
similar protection in anglo-American law. The expectation and reliance inter-
ests of the offeree thus being naked to the whims of the offeror prior to accep-
tance, it is not surprising that the Anglo-American courts have kept that
period of nakedness as short as possible by adoption of the dispatch rule.
Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-and-Acceptance
Doctrine, 36 CoLum. L. R.v. 920, 922 (1936) :
An unmistakable criticism as to the Adams v. Lindsell rule has been sufficiently
urged upon the courts. But they stick to it in England as well as in this
country. Something must be behind this attitude of the courts. An attempt
should be ventured to apply some "psychoanalysis" to their actions and to look
for the "complex" behind them.
The revocability doctrine may be the root of the trouble. Its connection with the
Adams v. Lindsell rule will become apparent from a comparative investigation.
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famous case of Adams v. Lindsell 0 1 in 1818, the English court adopted
a position freeing the offeree-buyer from his concern that the offeror-
seller might sell the goods to a third party before arrival of his com-
munication of acceptance, thereby precluding an effective acceptance.
Faced with the offeror's freedom to revoke his bare offer, the court
gave legal effect to the expression of acceptance as soon as it was
properly manifested by a reasonable effort to communicate. This
"dispatch" rule of Adams v. Lindsell flowed as a natural consequence
from the revocability of the bare offer. And the development of this
relationship is not peculiar to the Anglo-American legal system; the
revocability rule was applied in Germany at an earlier date. At one
time the revocability rule, placing the time of consummation of the
contract at the time of mailing the notice of acceptance, had also been
applied by German courts. 0 2 In France, a divergence of views devel-
oped regarding both the revocability of the offer and the time of effec-
tive acceptance. 0 3 Japanese law also recognizes the dispatch rule.04
Judicial application of the "dispatch" rule is especially important to
the offeree, for by shortening the period between his receipt of the
communicated offer and the time when a binding contract is consum-
mated by his acceptance, the extent of his risk is proportionately
reduced. Destruction of the property specified in the offer,215 or the
death of the offeree 0 6 between the posting of the acceptance and its
.1 Barn & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250 (K.B. 1818). The offeror's letter in which he
roposed to sell certain goods and requested an answer by return post, was mis-
irected with the result that the acceptance arrived two days later than expected.
On the day following that when the acceptance would have arrived if the original
letter had been properly directed, the offeror sold the goods to a third party. The
posting of the acceptance constituted a contract binding both parties and entitling
the offeree to recover in an action for the offeror's failure to complete performance of
the contract.
-"Oberrappellationsgericht Rostock, March 26, 1849, 7 Seufferts Archiv 16(Roman law) ; Oberhofgericht Manheim, 1861, 16 Seufferts Archiv 203 (French law
applicable in Baden). Nussbaum, Comparative Aspects of the Anglo-American
Offer-And-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 CoLflm. L. Ray. 920, 925 n.34 (1936).
See notes 216-26, 251-52, 255-56 infra and accompanying text.
' See text accompanying note 211 infra.
-Brisban v. Boyd, 4 Paige 17 (N.Y. 1832) (cotton burned while defendant's
letter accepting offer to take the cotton on joint account was in transit to the
plaintiff-offeror).
"' factier's Adm'rs v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103 (N.Y. 1830). Mactier's reply by mail
to Frith's offer to take brandy on his own account was in transit when Mactier died.
The court relied upon Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Ald. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250
(K.B. 1818).
In Potter v. Sanders, 6 Hare 1, 10, 67 Eng. Rep. 1057 (Ch. 1846), the English
Court of Chancery observed as dictum: "If the vendor had died on the 23rd after
posting the letter of that date, I can scarcely entertain a doubt that the plaintiff
would, in this court, have been the owner of the estate as against the heir of the
vendor." Cf. Kennedy v. Thomassen, [1929] 1 Ch. 426, where the trustees of a will,
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receipt, have been the subject of litigation. In addition, there is the
risk of a delayed or lost communication of acceptance, 07 as well as
of disadvantageous price fluctuation during the interim. Of course,
judicial application of the dispatch rule does not always result in an
advantage to the offeree.2 °0
By specifying that the acceptance must be received within a stated
time, the offeror can control the period during which the acceptance
may become effective. 0 9 But if he merely specifies that delivery of the
acceptance be made within the allotted time, his specification may be
satisfied by "delivery" of the acceptance to the postal authorities.210
having offered to redeem certain annuities held by the deceased, sent the deceased's
solicitor a draft release which the deceased executed on January 12, 1928, five days
before her death. The solicitors did not inform the trustees that the release had been
executed until January 24, seven days after her death. The money was paid to the
solicitors for the deceased on January 30, notice of the death not being received
until January 31. It was held that the money must be returned, as the dispatch of
the communication of acceptance by the solicitors was not made until after the
offeree's death. In a contract for the sale of goods, UCC § 2-206(2) might produce a
similar result.
' Late delivery: Adams v. Lindsell, 1 Barn. & Aid. 681, 106 Eng. Rep. 250
(K.B. 1818) (acceptance was not received by the offeror in the expected time due to
fact that the offer had been misdirected) ; Dunlop v. Higgins, 1 H.L. Cas. 381, 12 Jur.
295, 9 Eng. Rep. 805 (H.L. 1848) (seller attempted to sell offered lot of pig-iron
to third party after offeree-buyer had posted acceptance).
Lost communication of acceptance: Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297
F.2d 497, 498 (1st Cir. 1962) :
Defendant testified that in accordance with its regular practice the acknowl-
edgment was prepared and mailed the same day. The plaintiff's principal
liability witness testified that he did not know whether this acknowledgment
"was received, or what happened to it." On this state of the evidence there is an
unrebutted presumption of receipt. Johnston v. Cassidy, 1932, 279 Mass. 593,
181 N.E. 748; cf. Tobin v. Taintor, 1918, 229 Mass. 174, 118 N.E. 247.
In Bassar v. Camp, 1 Kerman 441 (N.Y. 1854), acceptance was duly posted but was
never received by the offeror, who did not learn of such acceptance until more than
one month later. Relying on Adams v. Lindsell and concurring cases, the court found
a completed contract at the time that the letter of acceptance was duly posted, regard-
less of what happened to it afterwards.
'See, e.g., Tayloe v. The Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 50 U.S. (9 How.) 390(1850): Communication accepting offer to insure building was in transit when the
building was destroyed by fire. The insurance company was obligated under a bind-
ing contract created upon posting the acceptance.
Postal Telegraph Cable Co. v. Louisville Cotton Seed Oil Co., 140 Ky. 506,
131 S.W. 277 (1910); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Gardner, 278 S.W. 278 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1925): "Receipt" limitation based upon general understanding of the con-
tracting parties, thereby enabling the seller-acceptor to bring an effective action
against the telegraph company for failure to deliver the telegram of acceptance; Fire
Ass'n v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 129 F. Supp. 335, 344 (N.D. Iowa 1955) (accep-
tance was not received within the allotted time, but renewed offer was subsequently
accepted).
'Morello v. Growers Grape Prods. Ass'n, 82 Cal. App. 2d 365, 186 P.2d 463,
467 (Dist. Ct. App. 1947): "The word 'delivered' in the offer creates only an ap-
parent, not a real difficulty, because under the law dealing with the formation of
contracts delivery of an acceptance to the post office operates as delivery to the per-
son addressed, except in unusual cases." See also Annot., Time when offer or proposi-
ion is mailed or when it is received through mail as commencement of period allowedfor acceptance, 72 A.L.R. 1214 (1931); Caldwell v. Cline, 109 W. Va. 553, 156 S.E. 55
(1930).
[ VOL. 42 : 347
FORMATION OF CONTRACTS
B. The Civil Law
Although Japanese Civil Code article 97(1) states the general rule
that a declaration of intention takes effect upon its arrival, article
526(1) provides an exception: a contract inter absentes comes into
existence at the time the notice of acceptance is dispatched. However,
when the period for acceptance is specified in the offer, article 521(2)
provides that notice of acceptance must be received within the period
specified in the offer. If the offeror does not receive notice of accept-
ance within the specified period, the offer shall lapse. How to reconcile
these seemingly contradictory provisions, viz., the dispatch rule of
article 526(1) as opposed to article 521(2)'s requirement of receipt
within the specified period, has long been the topic of heated argument
among Japanese scholars. While there are no reported cases on the
point, the prevailing and more persuasive view is as follows: The
dispatch rule of article 526(1) is the general rule as to time of contract
formation, while article 521(2) is a special rule applicable only to
contracts in which a period for acceptance has been specified. Analyti-
cally, the contract is formed at the time acceptance is dispatched, even
when the offeror specifies the period of acceptance; then, if the offeror
fails to receive the acceptance within the specified period, the legal
effect of the contract formation is lost retroactively. Of course, when
no period of acceptance is specified in the offer, the dispatch rule of
article 526(1) applies.
European and South American countries are divided on the question
of the effective time of acceptance of an offer where notice of accept-
ance is communicated between parties at a distance from each other.
Germany adopts the time of the offeror's receipt of the notice, based
on article 130 of the German Civil Code.212 Communication to the
offeror's residence, or to an employee who can reasonably be expected
to take messages at his place of business, satisfies this requirement.1 3
" For the various scholarly opinions see Takashima, Keiyaku no seiritsu
(Formation of a contract) JualsuTo (Bessatsu No. 4) 76, 77 (1965).
- GERPAAN CIVIL CODE art. 130, para. 1 (1900): "A declaration addressed to
another person, if made in the absence of the latter, becomes effective when he
receives it." This position is restricted by reason of article 151 of the German
Civil Code (BGB) permitting the conclusion of a contract without communication
of acceptance if tacit acceptance is usual as regards the particular class of agreement,
or if the offeror has waived the communication of acceptance. Nussbaum, Coin-
parative Aspects of the Anglo-American Offer-And-Acceptance Doctrine, 36 CoLumI.
L. REv. 920, 922 (1936). See also Comment, 7 TULANE L. REV. 590, 597 (1935).
" T. v. S., 97 RGZ 336 (Reichsgericht, Jan. 3, 1920) (telephone message left with
the telephone operator in the offeror's irm was not a satisfactory communication to
the offeror, but the court indicated that receipt of the message by proper personnel
would constitute receipt by the offeror). Cf. UCC § 1-201(26) : "A person 'receives'
1967]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
A number of European nations besides Germany, 14 as well as some of
the South American countries,21 apply the requirement that the notice
of acceptance is not effective until it is received by the offeror, or (in
some countries) until it is brought to the offeror's knowledge.
French commentary during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
including that of Masse, Troplong, and Troullier, 16 followed the
a notice or notification when . . . (b) it is duly delivered at the place of business
through which the contract was made or at any other place held out by him as the
place for receipt of such communications."
"'Austria (AusTRAAN CIVIL CODE art. 862; 1 HASENOHRL, DAS OSTERREICHISHE
OmmATinO anRECHr (1892) 654.
Belgian: The following opinions recognize the acceptance as effective at the
time of receipt: Brussels, 8 Nov. 1911, Pasicrisie, 1912.1.239; Liege, 19 Nov. 1913,
Pasicrise, 1914.2.18; Trib. Civ. Liege, 9 Aug. 1917, Pasicrisie, 1918.3.127; Trib.
Coi. Liege, 19 Nov. 1926, Pasicrisie, 1927.2.369. 2 Planiol, Traiti 6lmentaire de
Droit Civil sec. 986.
Italy: ITALIAN CIVIL CODE art. 1326: "A contract is complete when he who makes
an offer has knowledge of the other party's acceptance." Court of Cassation, Rome,
April 5, 1916, Giurisprudenza Italiana 1916 I. 732. Art. 1328, para. 2: "Acceptance
may be revoked, provided the offeror is made aware of it before such acceptance.";
ITA.IAN ComwxRcmm CODE art. 36, para. 1. "When persons are not in each other's
presence, a bilateral contract is not consummated before the offeror has received
notice of the acceptance within the time fixed by him or necessary under ordinary
conditions for the interchange of offer-and-acceptance dependent upon the kind of
contract involved and upon the general commercial usage." See 2 BOLAFFIO, 11
CODICF DI Comaailo 145 (5th ed. 1923). Exceptions to the above rule in the Italian
Commercial Code have limited its application. 12 Baudry-Lacantinerie et Barde,
Trait6 theorique et practique de droit civil (3d ed. 1906), Des obligations 1, note
26, n. 39, p. 66 fn. 3. The proposed Franco-Italian Project, Project de Code des
obligations et des contracts Art 2 permitted either party to revoke prior to the
offeror's receipt of knowledge of the acceptance. 2 PLANIOL, TRAITt ELENTARE
DE DROIT CIVIL § 986. However, it was presumed that the contents of the communica-
tion were known upon arrival.
Spain: SPANISH CIVIL CODE art. 1262 (1889): "An acceptance made by letter
shall not bind the person making the offer except from the time it comes to his
knowledge." But cf. SPAxiSH Co rEacrA. CODE art. 54 and note 256 infra.
Switzerland: article 10, sec. 1 of the Code of Obligations appears to adopt the
"dispatch-acceptance" rule, but this merely refers to the retroactive effect of the
acceptance. 5 OSER AND SCHOENENBERGER, KomNTAR ZUM SCHWVEIZERSCHEIT ZIVIL-
GESETZBUCH (DAS OBLIGATIONENREcHT) (2d ed. 1929) 82. Nussbaum, supra note 212,
at 922.
de Visscher includes Belgium, Romania, Bulgaria and Portugal among the
European countries requiring that the notice of acceptance must come to the "knowl-
edge" of the offeror to be effective. Jacques de Visscher, Du moment et du lieu de
dormation des cmtracts par correspondence en droit international prive, 19 RM'UE
DE DROxr INTERNATIONAL 90-91 (1938).
Ehrenzweig includes Czechoslovakia, as well as Austria, as adopting the time of
receipt, according to doctrine, as expressed in German jurisprudence. 2 EHRENZ-
WEIG, SYSTEm DES OsTERREIScHEN ALLGEmEINEN PRIVATRECHTS 154. Winfield also
includes Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Poland (CODE OF OBLIGATIONS art. 70) and
Russia (U.S.S.R. CIVIL CODE art. 134) as applying the time of receipt.
"'Cvl CODE OF MExIco art. 1807: "The contract arises at the moment when the
proponent receives the acceptance, being bound by his offer according to the fore-
going articles." (Schoenrich translation). Orbregon includes Panama, San Sal-
vador, Uruguay, and Venezuela as adopting a similar position. ORBREGON, LATIN-
AFsmcAN CoimcErmAL LAW 290 (1921).
"'M. MASSE, ANSALDuS, DE CoImRcIo ET MERCATuRA, Disc. 61, n. 9; TROPLONG,
DROIT Civn. ExPLI Q E, DE LA VENTE, ch. 1, nn° 22-25 ;TRouLmER, 6 DE Dnorr CIVIL
FRANcAis 3, sec. 29, n. 1.
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position developed by the civilians, that an acceptance was not legally
effective until it was communicated. Merlin,217 although perhaps incor-
rectly, interprets Pothier's writings as being in agreement. 21 There is,
however, no doubt that judicial writers were not in complete agree-
ment.
Nor has this division of opinion in France been limited to scholarly
writings; there has been an equal lack of uniformity among the French
courts. During the nineteenth century this division of judicial opinion
was extreme, with some courts holding the acceptance effective from
the time of the offeree's expression of decision " (emission theory)
and with others holding it not effective until notice of the offeree's
decision actually came to the knowledge of the offeror (information
theory) .220
Most twentieth century decisions in France have applied either the
reception theory (holding that the contract is established when the
notice of acceptance reaches the offeror, regardless of his personal
knowledge),2' or the expedition theory, (holding that the contract is
established when the notice of acceptance is dispatched).22 Advocates
of the former find some support in article 932 of the French Civil Code,
which pertains to the effective time of donations,223 whereas proponents
DuvRGar, 1 DE LA VENTE, Nos. 59-61, reasons that the acceptance is effective
from the date of posting of the notice as the offeree thereby loses his ability to
exercise control over the communication. Troplong rejects this argument. TROPLONG,
1 LE DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUE, L'EXCHANGE ET DU LOUGAGE, ch. 5, no. 105 n. 4. "It is of
no consequence whether a letter can be withdrawn from the post office by the writer
after it is posted, for that is a matter of regulation merely for the safety of communi-
cation; and if it is true that the writer cannot withdraw the letter, it is no less true
that the person to whom it is addressed has no power over it until it is delivered to
him." Note, Contract by Letter, 7 Am. L. REv. 433, 455 (1873).
1' MERLIN, REPERTOIRE DE JURISPRUDEICE, Vente sec. 1, art. 3 n. 11 bis., interpreting
POTHIER, CONTRAT DE VENTE, para. 1, sec. 1, art. 3, n. 32.
' See Note, Contract by Letter, 7 Am. L. REv. 434, 449 (1873).
" Bordeaux, 1892.1.29, 2 D.P. 390. Aubrey, The Formation of International
Contracts With Reference to the Uniform Law on Formation, 14 INT. & Comp. L.Q.
1011, 1014 (1965).
rDe Marans v. Deschamps, Orleans, 26.6.1886 D. 1885.135; Aubrey, supra note
219, at 1014.
" Trib. Civ. Paritaire Saint-Calais, 21.12.1949, D. 1950.236, n* H. Lalou; Paris,
31.5.1937, D.H. 1937.431; Nimas, 4.3.1908, D. 19082248.
'Lyon, 11.5.1951, Mon. Jud. Lyon, 26.12.1951; Trib. Civ. Loches, 25.6.1945, D.
1946.113; Paris, 5.2.1910, D. 1913.2.1, n* Valry.
= Fa Ca CIVIL CODE art. 932:
A donation during life shall not bind the donor, or produce any effect, except
from the day on which it shall have been accepted in express terms.
The acceptance may be made, the donor living, by a subsequent and authentic
act, of which a minute shall remain; but then the donation shall not have
effect with regard to the donor, except from the day on which the act which shall




of the latter refer to article 1985, which concerns the time of accep-
tance of procuration. 24
The French Court of Cassation has in the past been of the opinion
that the question is one of fact that must depend upon the particular
circumstances and the probable intent of the parties,223 but it has
shown a recent tendency to favor the expedition theory. 26 Many
nations,227 in addition to the United States and Japan, today apply
this theory of the time of contract formation, although, as has been
seen,22 there are many other countries that apply different theories.
The committee 229 of the International Institute for the Unification
of Private Law, in its initial draft proposal of 1936, proposed that the
contract be concluded at the place and moment of dispatch of the
communication of acceptance, with exceptions for contrary stipulation
or for the employment of an unusual means of acceptance. 23 °  The
committee chose this rule in the belief that it was the one most often
used, especially in international commerce.23'
'FRENcHi CIVI.. CODE art. 1985, para. 2: "The acceptance of procuration may be
merely tacit, and result from the performance which has been given to it by the
agent." Procuration is an act by which one person gives another the power to act in
his name and for his benefit. FRENCH Civm CODE art. 1984, para. 1.
Soc. 20.7.1954, J.C.P. 1955.2.8775, no Rabut, Rev. Trim. 1955.647 n0 Mazeaud;
Req. 29.1.1923, S. 1923.1.168, D. 1923.1.176 (applying expedition rule). Amos &
WALTON, INTODUCTON TO FRENCH LAW 157 (2d ed. 1963).
I Soc. 22.6.1956, Recueil Dalloz 1957 somm. 47, Rev. Trim. 1956.517, no Mazeaud
(favoring expedition theory); Soc. 22.4.1955, Recueil Dalloz 1956 somm. 62; Req.
21.3.1932, D.P. 1933.1.65, Note, de la Marni~re; Les Grands Arrets n. 84.
'Winfield suggests that the greater number of nations adopt the theory of
expedition. In addition to France and Japan he includes among the civil law
countries Egypt, Morocco, and Spain (CoMMERCIA. CODE art. 54). The Spanish
Civil Code adopts the time of receipt. See note 214 supra. Winfield, Some Aspects
of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L.Q. REv. 499, 507 (1939).
The following countries of South America applying the Spanish system to com-
mercial transactions adopt the expedition theory: Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Equador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru. OBREGON, LATIN-AzmucAN
COMMERCIAL LAW 290 (1921). Obregon also includes Mexico in this category, but
article 1807 of the Mexican Civil Code (1928) provides that the contract arises
when the acceptance is received.
See notes 212-15 supra and accompanying text.
'The following committee was appointed by the President of the Institute:
M. M. d'Amelio, President; A. Asquini (Italy); A. Bagge (Sweden); L. Biamonti
(Representative of the International Chamber of Commerce) ; H. Capitant (France) ;
Sir Civil J. P. Hurst and Sir W. Graham-Harrison (Great Britain); J. l.
Manzanilla (Peru); J. Hamel (France); E. M. Meijers (Netherlands); Guido von
Strobele (Austria). Reporters: M. C. Righetti, (Secretary General of the Institute),
C. Baldoni and S. Cerulli Irelli (of the Institute). See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE
FOR THE UNFICATION OF PRzvATE LAW 160, 161 (1948).
"
3 UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL LAW art 8(1) (c) (1936 draft) : "Where the acceptance
takes place by an express declaration, the place and the moment of the conclusion of the
contract are (C) The place and the moment the acceptance is dispatched in all other
cases."
'iMeijers, Underlying Principles of the Draft Concerning the Conclusion) of
Contracts by Correspondence, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF PRIVATE LAW 71, 81 (1948): "The Committee finally decided that when the two
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World War II forced the postponement of consideration of this
legislation, and the Governing Council of the Institute established a
new committee in 1956.2"2 This committee's revised draft, submitted
to the Governing Council in 1958, abandoned the previously submitted
"dispatch-acceptance" rule, and replaced it with the requirement that
the notice of acceptance must be communicated to the offeror by de-
livery at his address. The present formulation contains the 1964
drafting committee's recommendation that when the parties are at a
distance, the contract is formed at the time of the offeror's receipt of
the communication of acceptance, changing the earlier recommenda-
tion-' 3 favoring adoption at the time of expedition.3 4 Although this
proposal represents the established law of Germany and of other
nations with a similar viewpoint, it is not consonant with either the
common law or with the prevailing position in many civil law countries,
including Japan, France, and most nations of South America.
C. Delayed Receipt or Late Communication of Acceptance
Although in Japan it is required that the notice of acceptance must
be received within the period specified in the offer to be legally effec-
tive, there is an exception expressed in article 522 of the Japanese
laws differ on this point, the place and moment in which acceptance is dispatched
are the place and moment of the conclusion of the contract, because this is the system
followed by the laws more often applied in international commerce."
' Members of the Committee appointed in April 1956: A. Bagge, president,
Ascarelli de Castro y Bravo, Gutzwiller, Hamel, Riese and Wortley, members.
Messrs. Bagge and Hamel had served as members of the original committee. INTER-
NATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 1958 YEARBOOK 53.
UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT arts. 5, 7, 9, 10, 12 (1958 draft).
'UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT (1964 draft) :
Art. 5, para 4: A revocation of an offer shall only have effect if it has been
communicated to the offeree before he has dispatched his acceptance or has done
any act treated as acceptance under para. 2 of article 6. (Emphasis added.)
Art. 6, para. 1: Acceptance of an offer consists of a declaration communicated
by any means whatsoever to the offeror.
Art. 8, para. 1: A declaration of acceptance of an offer shall have effect only
if it is communicated to the offeror within the time he has fixed or, if no such
time is fixed, within a reasonable time, due account being taken of the cir-
cumstances of the transaction, including the rapidity of the means of communi-
cation employed by the offeror, and usage.
Art. 10: An acceptance cannot be revoked except by a revocation which is
communicated to the offeror before or at the same time as the acceptance.
Art. 12, para 1: For the purposes of the present law, the expression "to be
communicated" means to be delivered at the address of the person to whom the
communication is directed.
Thus the offeror may not be able to revoke his offer communicated to the offeree
after notice of acceptance has been dispatched, but the offeree may revoke such ac-
ceptance by communication to the offeror before or at the same time as the acceptance,
see id. art. 10. This is justifiable as neither party desires the formation of a binding




Civil Code. If the offeror has reason to know that the late notice of
acceptance was dispatched so that in normal circumstances it would
have arrived within the specified period, and if he has not already sent
notice, he must promptly dispatch notice of the delayed arrival to the
offeree. If the offeror fails to give such notice, the delay in the receipt
of notice of acceptance is disregarded. Additionally, article 523 of
the Japanese Civil Code, following the German Civil Code,233 permits
the offeror to regard the delayed acceptance as a new offer.
The offer to enter into a contract made inter absentes that does not
state a period for acceptance lapses if notice of its acceptance is not
dispatched by the offeree within a reasonable period.23 6 This view is
adopted by most legal systems today, although some Ibero-American
laws fix the delay at a specified number of days according to the
distance involved..2 17 The Uniform International Act combines both
views. Where no time is fixed, the declaration of acceptance of an
offer must be communicated within a reasonable time, with due account
taken of the circumstances, including the rapidity of the means of
communication used by the offeror as well as usage.2 8
The necessity of notifying the offeree of the delayed arrival of his
acceptance, to preclude its effectiveness, is indigenous to the civil law;
this requirement in Japanese law was derived from article 149 of the
German Civil Code. Section 73 of the Second Restatement of Con-
tracts expresses the accepted common law position that the late
acceptance merely constitutes an offer to the original offeror. The
recipient (the original offeror) of the late acceptance may be under a
duty to notify the other party (the original offeree) that he does not
intend to be bound by the later acceptance. This duty results from
previous dealings, however, or from usage in the particular trade, that
should lead the original offeree to understand that receipt of the
delayed acceptance without objection constitutes acceptance.239 This
'GERMAN CIvI. CODE (BGB) art. 150. Cohn, Civil Law, in 1 GREAT BRITAIN
FOREIGN OFFICE MANUAL OF GERMAN LAW 50 (1950).
'JAPANESE COMMERCIAL CODE art. 508(1), the text of which is set forth in note
26 .upra.
'Meijers, Underlying Principles of the Draft Concerning the Conclusion of
Contracts by Corresponwdenwe, in INTERNATIONAL INsTITTE FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF PRIVATE LAW 71, 79 (1948).
UNIFORM IiTERNALN ACT art. 8, para. 1 (1964 draft).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 73: "Effect of Receipt by Offeror of a
Late or Otherwise Defective Acceptance. A late or otherwise defective acceptance
may be effective as an offer to the original offeror, but his silence operates as an
acceptance in such a case only as stated in section 72."
§72. Acceptance by Silence or Exercise of Dominion: "(1) Where an offeree
fails to reply to an offer, his silence and inaction operate as an acceptance in the
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is very different from the civil law, where the duty to give notice rests
upon the necessity of investigating the document containing the accep-
tance, to determine whether the circumstances under which it was sent
were such that it would have been communicated in due time if the
transmission had been normal.
The Uniform International Act adopts the civil law position. 4  The
drafting committees who prepared the pre-World War II drafts of the
proposed Uniform International Act24' intentionally rejected the civil
law position on notice of intent by the offeror, following his receipt of
delayed acceptance. It was their belief that the results of the applica-
tion of this rule were usually the same as those obtained by use of the
general rule that the delayed acceptance constituted a new offer. 42
Besides, most legislative drafts at that time were discarding this posi-
tion, even in jurisdictions where it had been recognized. Yet, surpris-
ingly, following the termination of World War II, upon resumption of
work toward a final draft, the drafters introduced the matter of notice
to the offeree upon delayed arrival of acceptance into the 1958 "Rome"
draft;-43 this has been carried forward into the current proposal.
This position is subject to criticism because it will be difficult for
the offeror to always determine whether the notice of acceptance would
have been communicated in due time in normal circumstances. An
offeror who has received delayed notice of acceptance may misjudge
the necessity of dispatching prompt notice that he considers his offer
to have lapsed. Although this notice must be furnished promptly, there
following cases and in no others: . . . (c) Where because of previous dealings or
otherwise it is reasonable that the offeree should notify the offeror if he does not
intend to accept."
2, UNIFORM INTERNATIONAL AcT art. 9, para. 2 (1964 draft):
If however the acceptance is communicated late, it shall be considered to have
been communicated in due time, if the letter or document which contains the
acceptance shows that it has been sent in such circumstances that if its trans-
mission had been normal it would have been communicated in due time; this
provision shall not however apply if the offer has promptly informed the
acceptor orally or by dispatch of a notice that he considers his offer as having
lapsed.
A Working Committee of the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law (President: Sir Cecil Hurst; Members: Messrs. Bagge, Capitant,
Gutteridge, Hamel and Rabel) undertook in 1930 to draft a uniform law on the
international sale of goods. Their preliminary draft was submitted to the Governing
Council in 1934. In this year it was decided to begin separate work on the
formation of contracts for the international sale of goods, and in 1936 a draft
Uniform Law on International Contracts by Correspondence had been prepared. For
English translation of this draft, see INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFI-
CATION OF PRIVATE LAW 161 (1948).
C Meijers, Underlying Principles of the Draft Concerning the Conclusion of
Contracts by Correspondence, in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION
OF PRIvATE LAW 71, 83 (1948).
" UNIFORu INTERNATIONAL Acr art. 8 (1958 draft).
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is a possibility of the offeror's using this provision for speculation
where it is apparent that the notice would normally have been com-
municated in due time.244
IX. COUNTERMANDING UNCOMMUNICATED ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER
Application of the "dispatch" rule by common law jurisdictions
precludes the offeror from effectively withdrawing his offer after the
offeree's notice of acceptance has been dispatched. It is irrelevant that
the notice of withdrawal was dispatched prior to the dispatch of the
acceptance, since the revocation is not effective until it is received. -4 5
There are a few decisions in the United States that reflect a different
position regarding the effective time of acceptance or revocation of the
offer,246 but most of them involve unilateral mistake; a similar result
UNIFORm INTERNATIONAL ACT art. 9, para. 2 (1964 draft) provides that this is
to be ascertained by inquiry as to whether "the letter or document which contains
the acceptance shows that it has been sent in such circumstances .... " Although
this communication may show the date of dispatch, it will not assist the recipient in
determining the customary time necessary for transmittal. This information must
be acquired from other sources. Whether if such transmission had been normal it
would have been communicated in due time becomes a rather close question of fact.
See Aubrey, The Formation of Inter;ational Contracts, With Reference to the
Uniform Law on Formation, 14 INT. & CouP. L.Q. 1011, 1020, 1021 (1965).
Farnsworth, Formation of International Sales Contracts: Three Attempts at
Unificatio0, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 305, 323 (1962) : "The objection of this rule is that
it enables the offeror to speculate on fluctuations in the market and on changes in
other conditions between the time when the offeree sent the acceptance and the time
when the offeror must decide whether to consider it as an acceptance."
" Barnebey v. Barron G. Collier, Inc., 65 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1933) ; Stephen
M. Weld & Co. v. Victory Mfg. Co., 205 Fed. 770 (E.D.N.C. 1913): Plaintiff, a
cotton dealer, accepted an offer to purchase cotton by depositing a telegram in the
office of Western Union in Philadelphia at 10:15 a.m. At 10:40 a.m. plaintiff
received a telegram from the defendant cotton mill company attempting to revoke its
offer to sell. Plaintiff's telegram of acceptance was not received by defendant until
12:35 p.m.; L. & E. Wertheimer, Inc. v. Wehle-Hartford Co., 126 Conn. 30, 9 A.2d
279 (1939), 125 A.L.R. 985 (plaintiff effectively accepted offer to sell whiskey);
Paramount Pictures Distrib. Corp. v. Gehring, 283 Ill. App. 581 (1936) (plaintiff
effectively accepted offer for rental of motion pictures) ; Ziehme v. McInerney, ,67
Ill. App. 577 (1912) (letter of acceptance posted by plaintiff-seller, and jewelry
shipped, before receipt of notice of revocation of the offer to purchase) ; Farmers'
Produce Co. v. McAlester Storage & Comm'n Co., 48 Okla. 488, 150 Pac. 483 (1915)
(court relied in part on OKz.A. STAT. ANN. §§ 913, 914 (1910)) ; Ellard v. Waterloo
Mfg. Co., 20 Sask. 601, [1926] 3 D.L.R. 207 (defendant-buyer effectively posted letter
accepting offer to sell before he received plaintiff's notice that the offer had been
withdrawn). See also Annot., Time and place of consumption of contract on accep-
tanwe by telegraph of offer, 47 A.L.R. 159 (1927).
Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, 130 ct. cl. 698, 128 F. Supp. 417 (1955),
is usually considered as expressing a "minority" position based upon ability to con-
trol the communication. The court, however, observed, 128 F. Supp. at 418: "The
record does not show whether the notice of award was mailed before or after the
telephone conversation in which plaintiff advised the defendant of its mistake and
asked to withdraw its bid." The decision may also be rationalized on the theory of
unilateral mistake. See note 247 infra and accompanying text.
"' Rhode Island Tool Co. v. United States, supra note 245, 128 F. Supp. at 420
(plaintiff sought to withdraw bid due to mistake): "The reason for the old rule
had disappeared. This does not change any principle, it simply changes the practice
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could have been obtained by placing greater emphasis upon this
factor.4r
Although the application of the "dispatch-acceptance" rule protects
the offeree against a subsequent communication of revocation, its strict
application also serves to preclude him from countermanding his own
acceptance made at a distance, once it has been dispatched. The dis-
patched acceptance binds the offeree, even if it comes to the offeror's
attention after he has received a subsequently dispatched notice coun-
termanding the acceptance.248
There is little reason, other than a desire for uniformity of position,
to apply the "dispatch-acceptance" rule in these circumstances. Under
the rule, the offeror in such a case is permitted to force a binding
to suit the changed conditions, but leaves unchanged the principle of finality, which
is just as definite as ever, though transferred to a different point by the new [postal]
regulation."; Dick v. United States, 113 Ct. Cl. 94, 82 F. Supp. 326 (1949), 59 YALE
L.J. 374 (1950) ; Pacific Alaska Contractors v. United States, 157 F. Supp. 844 (Ct.
Cl. 1958): Plaintiff-bidder wrote, and apparently posted, a letter accepting the
government's partial award, on the day prior to the United States' (defendant) tele-
gram of revocation. Although the notice of acceptance is not a model of clarity, it
was posted prior to, and received after, notice of revocation. The court found that no
contract was created because notice of the acceptance was not received until after
the revocation had been communicated; Stahl v. Loeb, Cooney & Loeb, 209 Ill. App.
246 (1917) (abstract decision) : No contract established as defendant withdrew offer
before receiving plaintiff's notice of acceptance. There is no indication as to
whether the notice of revocation was received before dispatch of the notice of ac-
ceptance; Watters v. Lincoln, 29 S.D. 98, 135 N.W. 712 (1912): Under South
Dakota statute, revocation of offer effective when placed in the course of transmission
to the offeree. Notice of acceptance posted thereafter is ineffective to create a bind-
ing contract.
M' acNeil, Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems For A Single Rule, 112
U. PA. L. REX. 947, 955 (1964) : "Instead of facing up to the functional problem of
mistake, each time the court repudiated the dispatch rule generally... .Such a repudia-
tion was not, however, necessary. The state of the law of mistake would have per-
mitted relief in those cases without overthrowing the dispatch rule." In Rhode
Island Tool Co. v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 698, 128 F. Supp. 417, 421 (1955), the
court observed: "Manifestly a mistake was made. The defendant is not injured by
permitting its correction. It only forbids defendant's unjust enrichment by pre-
venting its taking technical advantage of an evident mistake."
For decisions applying the "receipt" of communication rule in other contexts see
Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1961) ; Guardian Nat'l Bank
v. Huntington County State Bank, 206 Ind. 185, 187 N.E. 388 (1933); Traders'
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920).
Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. App. 1963), 15 MERcER L. Rxv. 516(1964), 38 TUL. L. Rav. 566 (1964), 1 TUtLSA L.J. 188 (1964), is a recent application
of the "dispatch-acceptance" rule in these circumstances. A contract for the purchase
of realty had been mailed by appellants to appellees for their acceptance. Appellees
executed the instrument and deposited it in the mail addressed to the appellant's
attorney. Prior to the receipt of the contract, appellee telephoned the appellant's
attorney and revoked the acceptance. Presumably with knowledge of this telephone
conversation, appellant recorded the contract. Appellees sued to quiet title and ap-
pellants counterclaimed for specific performance. Applying the "dispatch-acceptance"
rule, the court found that both parties became bound when the acceptance was mailed.
A similar position was adopted in an earlier New Zealand decision. Wenkheim
v. Arndt, 1 J.R. 73. See Vinfield, Some Aspects of Offer and Acceptance, 55 L.Q.
RE,. 499, 505 (1939).
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contractual obligation upon the offeree.149 But when an offeree desires
not to enter into a binding contract, his desire should be recognized, so
long as it does not prejudice the offeror's interests. The desire of an
offeree whose notice of acceptance is received before the arrival in
normal course of his previously dispatched rejection should be similarly
regarded.
250
French jurisprudence, expressed by both Pothier25' and Pardes-
sus,252 favors permitting the offeree to withdraw his dispatched accep-
tance before it is received by the offeror, provided that the offeror is
indemnified for any loss sustained because of the withdrawal.
Within the common law system there have been deviations from this
strict application of the rule, by legislation in India,211 and by judicial
decision in Scotland.254 In France, Merlin, as the offeree's counsel,
persuaded the Court of Cassation in 1813 that the important factor
in these circumstances is the comparative receival times of the conflict-
Note, Contract by Letter, 7 Am. L. REv. 434, 451 (1873): "Moreover, it is
not a question of whether, for the sake of safety in communication, a letter cannot
be withdrawn from the post, but whether one can revoke the contents of a letter by
another communication that arrives more promptly than the first letter. Can any one
hesitate on this point?"
'This is the position recommended in Winfield, Some Aspects of Offer and
Acceptance, 55 L.Q. REv. 499, 511 (1939) : "Moreover, the acceptance is what the
offeree finally intended and the law is in favor of giving effect to a man's intention
unless, indeed, the other party is prejudiced by his change of mind; and it is hard to
see what harm the offeror has suffered here!'
Winfield had adopted a similar position where the notice of rejection, dispatched
subsequent to his acceptance, is the first communication received by the offeror.
However, his opinion changed. Id. at 511: "But why should he be allowed to do so
when once he has taken a decision?" Id. at 513: "First, any fair-minded man would
say that there was an agreement directly the letter of acceptance was posted.
Secondly, there is no reason why the law should encourage vacilation about accep-
tance on the part of the offeree. Thirdly, an offeror normally expects benefit from
the acceptance of his offer; why should he be deprived of that benefit simply because
the offeree has changed his mind after he has accepted?" But cf. A. E. Staley Mfg.
Co. v. Northern Co-Ops., Inc., 168 F2d 892 (8th Cir. 1948) (seller responded to offer
by proposing varying terms, and then attempted unsuccessfully to accept offer as
originally submitted).
' POTIER, CONTRAT DE VENTE, art. 3, § 1, para. 1. Note, Contract by Letter, 7
Am. L. Rxv. 434, 449 (1873).
2 PARDESSUS, COURS DE DRorT ComFsRcIAL, ch. 5, tit. 2, para. 2, n.250.
INDIAN CONTRACT AcT § 5: "An acceptance may be revoked at any time before
the communication of the acceptance is complete as against the acceptor, but not
afterwards." Winfield, supra note 250, at 505. See also Sabbiah v. Katha Venkatas-
sawmy, [1903] 27 Madras 355.
' Countess of Dunmore v. Alexander, 9 S. & D. 190 (1830): Betty Alexander
had expressed a desire to enter the service of the Countess of Dunmore. The Countess
wrote to Lady Agnew requesting that she engage Betty Alexander. Lady Agnew for-
warded the letter which was received by Betty Alexander at the same time as she
received a subsequently posted letter revoking the Countess' acceptance. The Court
of Sessions, in reversing the decree of the Sheriff Substitute, found that Lady Agnew
was the Countess' agent and therefore the acceptance was not effective until received.
The revocation having been received at the same time as the offer it served to
neutralize the acceptance.
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ing communications, regardless of which notice was dispatched first; 255
Masse affirms the soundness of this position.25 6
In Japan, neither the Civil Code nor the Commercial Code ex-
pressly answers these questions about the possibility of revocation of
notice of acceptance made inter absentes. Since there are no reported
cases, and scholars are divided in their attitudes, the solution rests in
the interpretation to be given related provisions of the Japanese Civil
Code. As already seen, article 526 provides that a contract inter
absentes comes into existence at the time the notice of acceptance is
dispatched. The drafters desired to preclude the revocation of the ac-
ceptance after the dispatch of notice. It was reasoned that since the
offeror is precluded from effectively revoking an offer where the notice
of revocation has not been received by the time the notice of acceptance
is dispatched it would be unjust to permit the offeree to revoke a dis-
patched acceptance and thereby utilize market fluctuations to gain
enrichment. This is the prevailing opinion today in Japan,2 57 although
there also exists a strong opposing position.258
The Japanese Great Court of Cassation, in Kawasaki v. Japan,259
held that where sealed bids in connection with government construction
contracts are to be opened at a meeting of all bidders, as required by
government regulations, the highest bid is considered an acceptance of
the government's offer, and it may not be withdrawn once the opening
of the bids starts.
X. OPTION CONTRACTS AND FIR OFFERS
The principal exception to the application of the "dispatch-accep-
tance" rule in Anglo-American law involves the time of effective
acceptance of an offer expressed in a binding option contract. Here
the communication of acceptance is not effective until it is received,
and the Second Restatement of Contracts now expresses this posi-
tion.2 0 The offeree may revoke his acceptance up until its receipt, but
- Merlin, Ripertiore de Jurisprudence, Vente sec. 1, art. 3, nl. 11 bis. Note, 7 Am.
L. Rnv. 434, 448 (1873).
1 MASSE, LE DROIT COMMERCIAL, tit. 3, cl. 1, § 2, n.8, art. 1.
5 (1) WAGATSUMA, SAIKEN KAKuRo 61 (1954).
' As to the details of scholarly views, see TAKASHIMA, Op. Cit. supra note 211, at
76, 77.
7 7 Minroku 157 (Gr. Ct. Cass., May 31, 1901). The intermediate appellate
court held that the bidder was deemed to have made an offer inter praesentes,
rather than an acceptance, and that its bid could be revoked before the government's
acceptance was effective. This opinion was quashed and the case remanded.
I RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 64: "Time When Acceptance Takes Ef-
fect. Unless otherwise provided,... (b) an acceptance under an option contract is
not operative until received by the offeror."
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he takes the risk of delay or of loss in transmission. In options for a
specified time particularly, the communication of acceptance must be
received by the expiration date to be effective. Much of the reported
litigation that served to develop this common law exception has been
explained on other bases,2 61 and the courts have rarely evaluated the
possible justifications for the exception. Frequently, the question
involves the time of effective notice for lease renewals or for purchase
options on realty.262
Where an option contract is involved, the offeree's affirmative re-
sponse is both a notice of acceptance and a condition of the promisor's
existing contractual duty. Corbin emphasizes the latter as the basis
for making the notice of acceptance effective upon receipt, rather than
upon dispatch.262 If the purpose of the notice is the termination of an
" (1) The offer may expressly require receipt of the acceptance: Lewis v.
Browning, 130 Mass. 173, 175-76 (1881). In McCulloch v. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick.
(18 Mass.) 277 (1822), the Massachusetts court adopted the "receipt-acceptance" rule
as to bare offers.
(2) Time was of the essence of the bargain: Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Wilcox,
194 F.2d 989, 991 (5th Cir. 1952) (renewed lease); Hoban v. Hudson, 129 Minn.
335, 152 N.W. 723 (1915) (shares of stock).
(3) Effectiveness of notice of cancellation rather than creation of contract in-
volved: Wheeler v. McStay, 160 Iowa 745, 141 N.W. 404 (1913); Brown Method
Co. v. Ginsberg, 153 Md. 414, 138 Atl. 402, 403 (1927): "But it seems to us that
termination at least involves setting the parties free of its obligation, and that this
cannot be regarded as accomplished unless and until that other party is notified of it.
Conceivably the other party might be legally free without knowing it, but its free-
dom would seem to be something less than practical men would intend in a contract
giving one a right to termination [sic] their relation at his election." Farmers'
Handy Wagon Co. v. Newcomb, 192 Mich. 634, 159 N.W. 152 (1915) (dicta);
Field v. Mann, 42 Vt. 61 (1869) (Peck dissenting) : Plaintiff agreed to notify the
defendant within three days if he decided not to keep and pay for the delivered skins.
Although the plaintiff's notice was posted in the allotted three days it was not
received until thereafter.
(4) Place rather than time of acceptance for purposes of conflicts of law involved:
Compania de Astral, S.X. v. The Boston Metals Co., 205 Md. 237, 107 A.2d 357,
(1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 943 (1955).
Williston suggests that the acceptance of the "option-offer", as distinguished
from other forms of option, may be subject to the general rules as to communication
of an acceptance. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §853 (rev. ed. 1936). See Shubert
Theatrical Co. v. Rath, 271 Fed. 827 (2d Cir. 1921); Martindell v. Fiduciary
Counsel, 133 N.J. Eq. 408, 30 A.2d 281, 284 (Ct. Err. & App. 1943) (dictum).
See, e.g., Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Wilcox, 194 F.2d 989, 991 (5th Cir. 1952)
(lease renewal-time of the essence); Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. National Shawmut
Bank, 342 Mass. 108, 172 N.E.2d 104, 106 (1961); Starr v. Holck, 318 Mich. 452,
28 N.W.2d 289 (1947); Hoban v. Hudson, 129 Minn. 335, 152 N.V. 723 (1915);
McCrory Stores Corp. v. Goldberg, 45 N.J. Eq. 152, 122 Atl. 113 (Ch. 1923): "As
a matter of policy, in a formal transaction such as the renewal of a lease so valuable
as this one is said to be, there should be no unnecessary extention of the privilege of
corresponding by mail. It requires little imagination to conceive of the innumerable
schemes that might be devised in fraud of other parties, if the rule is extended."
Cf. Kibler v. Caplis, 140 Mich. 28, 103 N.W. 531 (1905) (option to purchase hides,
the seller to be notified by a stated date).
11 A CORB N, CONTRACTS § 264 (1963):
It is believed that, in the absence of an expression of contrary intention, it
should be held that the notice must be received. As above explained, the notice
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existing contractual relationship-frequently the case-this basis for
distinction is certainly justified." 4 There is a more fundamental rea-
son, however, for recognizing the "receipt" rule in option contracts.
Since the offer is irrevocable only for the period of the option, the
offeree who decides to communicate his acceptance of the option
proposal runs the risk of a communicated revocation while his accep-
tance is in transmission. But the offeree's reliance interest is not in
jeopardy, as it is with the typical revocable offer. There is a direct
correlation, although it is seldom expressed by the courts, between the
offeror's power of revocation and the legal rule that is applied as to
the effective time of acceptance in transactions inter absentes.26 5
The UCC recognizes as binding a merchant's firm offer to buy or
sell goods, made in a signed writing that gives assurance that it will
be held open.266 The UCC does not express any position on the effec-
tive time of acceptance of such a firm offer, but the time of receipt of
the notice of acceptance should be used. When applied to this question
is in one aspect a notice of acceptance of an offer; but in another aspect it is a
condition of the promisor's already existing contractual duty. It is more likely
to be regarded in this latter aspect by the parties themselves.
Corbin expresses his personal objection to extending the "dispatch" rule to notice
of acceptance in already binding option contracts.
'With the exception of contracts to ship ordered goods, Corbin's examples in-
volve the power to terminate existing legal relations. 1A CORBIN, op. cit. supra
note 263, at 21 :
A landlord's "notice to quit" must be received by the tenant. The power of
termination of a contract of employment or of any other continuing contract, can
be effectively exercised only by bringing home notice to the other party, not
by merely mailing it to him. In a contract to ship goods as ordered, there is no
duty of immediate performance until an order is received.
In a practical sense there is no "duty" until receipt of notice because of lack of
prior communication, but it is circular reasoning to state that there is no "legal duty"
for this is dependent upon the legal rule adopted as to option contracts.
' RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 64, comment (f): "Option contracts.
An option contract provides a dependable basis for decisions whether to exercise the
option; and removes the primary reason for the rule of subsection (1). Moreover,
there is no objection to speculation at the expense of a party who has irrevocably
assumed that risk."
MacNeil Time of Acceptance: Too Many Problems for a Single Rule, 112 U. PA.
L. REv. 94, 975 (1964): "Also where the offer is irrevocable, one of the prime
reasons for the dispatch rule is lacking, namely the protection of the offeree against
the consequences of revocation." Id. at 969: "There is hardly a single case applying
the dispatch rule to loss or delay in transmission where it is clear both that the
offeree had not relied on the contract and that the offeror had relied on its non-
existence. Moreover in a large number of the cases applying the dispatch rule there
was heavy reliance by the offeree."
-' UCC § 2-205. Firm Offers.
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing which by
its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable
time, but in no event may such period of irrevocability exceed three months;
but any such term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be
separately signed by the offeror.
19671
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of the effective time of acceptance, reasoning that is valid with respect
to an option contract is equally valid with respect to an irrevocable
firm offer. 67
The UCC does adopt the logical position that the "dispatch-accep-
tance" rule should be applied where the beginning of the requested
performance is a reasonable mode of acceptance. The offeree, having
begun the requested performance, must take reasonable steps to inform
the offeror of his acceptance. If he dispatches this notice of acceptance
within a reasonable time, the offeree is protected in his reliance on an
established contract, without being subjected to the risks incident to
application of the rule that the acceptance is not effective until it is
received."' There is, however, a clear distinction (with respect to the
effective time of notice of a communicated acceptance) between the
notice of acceptance of an irrevocable firm offer, and the notice of ac-
ceptance of a bare offer, where the offeree has begun the requested
performance.
XI. THE LiVING LAw
A comparative study of American and foreign statutes and court
opinions concerned with the formation of commercial contracts pro-
vides insight into the development and direction of the formal legal
system and broadens the scope of our understanding." 9 But the
'In Haldane v. United States, 69 Fed. 819 (8th Cir. 1895), the offeror guaran-
teed to sell specified hay to the United States for sixty days at a stated price. The
government posted its notice of acceptance of this firm offer before the expiration of
the sixty days but it was not received within this allotted time. Thus the proposed
acceptance was not effective. The court reasoned, 69 Fed. at 822: "The doctrine is
well established that, when a statute requires notice to be given to a person for the
purpose of creating a liability, personal notice is intended, unless some other form
of notice is expressly authorized by the statute."
-UCC §2-206(2). "Where the beginning of a requested performance is a
reasonable mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance within a
reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed before acceptance." (Emphasis
added.)
UCC § 1-201(26): "A person 'notifies' or 'gives' a notice or notification to
another by taking such steps as may be reasonably required to inform the other in
ordinary course whether or not such other actually comes to know of it." UCC §
1-201, comment 26: "'Notifies'. New. This is the word used when the essential
fact is the proper dispatch of the notice, not its receipt. Compare 'Send'. When the
essential fact is the other party's receipt of the notice, that is stated."
Cammeo, Present Value of Comparative Jurisprudence, 4 A.B.A.J. 645 (1918);
Escarra, The Aims of Comparative Law, 7 TEmP. L.Q. 296 (1933); Lepaulle, The
Function of Comparative Law, 35 HARv. L. REv. 838 (1922) ; Pound, What May, fe
Expect Front Comparative Law?, 22 A.B.A.J. 56 '(1936) ; Schlesinger, Research on
the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 51 Am. J. INT'L L.
734 (1957); Schroeder, Comparative Law: A Subject for American Lawyers, 41
A.B.AJ. 928 (1955); Schwenk, Comparative Law in Action, 32 Tutr. L. REv. 599
(1958); Stone, The End to be Served by Comparative Law, 25 TuL. L. REv. 325
(1951); Wolff, The Utility of Foreign Law to the Practicing Lawyer, 27 A.B.A.J.
253 (1941).
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activities of commercial enterprises leading to the consummation of
contracts for the sale and purchase of goods are influenced by other
factors than the formal rules developed by the legal system. Inquiry
must also be directed into the nature and content of the documents
used, the manner of their formulation, and the extent to which they
influence commercial practice °70
Routine transactions involving the manufacturer's sale and distribu-
tion of goods are frequently handled today through standardized plan-
ning, that is, through the exchange of printed business documents
setting forth the terms and conditions of the transaction. These
documents are concerned with the performance itself, rather than with
future conditions or events such as defective execution of the agree-
ment. And little attention is given in routine transactions to the possi-
bility of using these printed documents to obtain legal enforcement of
the contract. 271
Trade associations have been successful in standardizing contract
forms in some industries; their efforts have reduced the exchange of
'See UCC § 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.
(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its under-
lying purposes and policies.(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are ... (b) to permit the
continued expansion of commercial practice through custom, usage and agree-
ment of the parties....
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards
are not manifestly unreasonable.
.(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words 'unless other-
wise agreed' or other words of similar import does not imply that the effect of
other provisions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3)....
See generally Bunn, Freedom of Contract Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
2 B.C. Iw. & Cois. L. REv. 59 (1961).
UNiroPm INTERNAIONAL AcT art. 2 (1964 draft) : "(1) The provisions of the
following Articles shall apply except to the extent that it appears from the pre-
liminary negotiations, the offer, the reply, the practices which the parties have
established between themselves or usage, that other rules apply."
Freedom of contract is recognized in all civil law systems. For example in
Germany the parties are free to contract their own contract under the principle of
Vertragsfrciheit, subject to limited restrictions. Cohn, Civil Law, in 1 GREAT
BRITAI N FOREIGN OFFICE MANUAL OF GERIAN LAW 70, nn212-14.
.' Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28
Am. Soc. REv. 55, 58 (1963) :
This type of standardized planning is very common. Requests for copies of the
business document used in buying and selling were sent to approximately 6,000
manufacturing firms which do business in Wisconsin. Approximately 1,200
replies were received and 850 companies used some type of standardized plan-
ning. With only a few exceptions, the firms that did not reply and the 350 that
indicated they did not use standardized planning were very small manufacturers
such as local bakeries, soft drink bottlers and sausage makers.
See also Macaulay, The Use and Non-Use of Contracts in the Manufacturng
Industry, Prac. Law., Nov. 1963, p. 13.
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conflicting printed forms and have produced terms more representative
of accepted trade practices. The use of these forms, which typically
serve the advantage of the association members, tends to establish
fixed practices in the industry, where often none existed. 2  These
efforts by trade organizations, as well as the related use of contracts of
adhesion, have been under study in both civil2 3 and common law
countries 27
4
Although trade usage is established factually, the UCC authorizes
judicial interpretation where usage is expressed in written trade
codes.2 75 Trade associations, representing various interested groups
within an industry, have occasionally joined together to develop mu-
tually agreeable standard contract forms, such as the order form
prepared by the National Retail Dry Goods Association. Similarly,
the Worth Street Rules were established by thirteen associations,
representing all interests in the cotton industry, to cover transactions
in cotton grey goods. 6 In addition, standard provisions have been
incorporated into order forms used by both sellers and purchasers of
goods due to the joint efforts of associations representing their inter-
ests.
277
Documents used in the formation of commercial sales contracts
indicate existing practices, and the standardized printed forms repre-
sent typical procedure. Nevertheless, there are many sales transactions
"'Note, Private Lawmaking by Trade Associations, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1346
(1949).
2Leaute, Les Contrats-Types, 51 PEVUE TRIM:ESTRIELLE DE DRorr CIvIL 429
, 1953) ; SALEILLES, DE LA DECLARATION DE VOLUNE 229 (1901) (origin of the term
A contract of Adhesion").
' Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental Breach, 50
VA. L. REV. 1178 (1964); Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About
Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUY. L. REv. 629 (1943). See also Erhenzweig, Adhesion
Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 53 COLum. L. REV. 1072 (1953).
' UCC § 1-205(2) ; Wright, Opposition of the Law to Business Usages, 26
COLUm. L. REv. 917, 930 (1926) :
In the first place, when there are standardized contracts, what otherwise would
possibly be fixed by usage is fixed by the contract. Everyone's interest is con-
centrated on what the contract means and requires. There is no room for the
growth of usage-nothing, or rather very little, out of which a customary way of
dealing will arise.
' The Worth Street Rules include a standard salesnote, specifications for goods,
and a statement of trade custom. See AssocATIOx OF CoTToN TEXTmEF MERCHANTS
OF NEW YORK (1943); Note, Private Lawmaking by Trade Associations, 62 HAv.
L. REv. 1346, 1350 (1949).
-- Basic Trade Provision No. 1, agreed upon by the National Retail Dry Goods
Association and the Trade Council of the Garment Association for incorporation as
a standard provision of order forms, provides: "It is mutually agreed and under-
stood that all the terms and conditions set forth on this order are satisfactory unless
the Seller notifies Purchaser to the Contrary, before shipment is made, within 15
days from the date of this order." Cf. UCC § 2-207(2) (b) (material alterations);
UCC § 1-102 (3) (freedom of contract).
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in which neither the manner of contract formation nor the mercantile
practice (including the extent of reliance placed upon legal sanctions)
can be determined except by direct investigation." ' One such investiga-
tion indicates that purchasing agents frequently enter into contracts for
goods which are not of a highly speculative nature, with the under-
standing derived from business practice that the executory order can be
cancelled, subject only to the payment of any expenses incurred by the
manufacturer prior to receipt of notice of cancellation. 79 Standardized
contracts of the garment industry recognize the trade practice that per-
mits the manufacturer to cancel style orders with immunity, if he has
given his purchaser advance notice.2"0 Ehrlich has correctly observed
that "the center of gravity of legal development lies not in legislation,
not in juristic science, nor in judicial decision, but in society itself." 28'
EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw 498 (Moll tr.
1936, 1962 reprint): "To be sure, to ask a jurist to learn from actual observation and
not from sections of a code or from bundles of legal papers is to make an exacting
demand upon him; but it is inavoidable, and marvelous results can be achieved in
this manner."
For an analysis of 500 contract cases published in the National Reporter System
for the year 1961, see Shepherd, Contracts in a Prosperity Year, 6 STAN. L. REV.
208 (1953).
M acaulay, supra note 271, at 61: "Yet all ten of the purchasing agents asked
about cancellation of orders once placed indicated that they expected to be able to
cancel orders freely subject to only an obligation to pay the seller's major expenses as
to scrapped steel." See also 2 HAv. Bus. RFv. 238-40, 367-70, 496-502 (1923-1924)
(case study of cancellation of contracts).
" Basic Trade Provision No. 5, 1949 agreement of the National Retail Dry
Goods Association and the Trade Council of the Garment Association: "In the
event that the Seller should be unable to manufacture, or determine not to inanu-
facture, any style contained in this Order, he shall immediately notify the Pur-
chaser to that effect and thereupon the Seller shall not be liable for nondelivery of
such merchandise. Purchaser shall, however, accept delivery and pay for all other
merchandise." (Emphasis added.) Note, Private Lawmaking by Trade Associations,
62 HARv. L. Rmv. 1346, 1355 n.45. (1949).
1 Foreword to EHRI.IcH, op. cit. supra note 278.
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